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INTRODUCTION 
Churches are often unpopular in the zoning context.1  They are un-
popular in residential zones because they allegedly generate too much 
traffic, noise, and congestion.  They are unpopular in commercial 
zones because they allegedly generate too little traffic and not enough 
“synergy” with surrounding businesses.  And they are unpopular with 
city officials because they are tax exempt.  Sometimes they are un-
 
* Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law, Horace W. Goldsmith Research 
Professor of Law, and Professor of Religious Studies, University of Virginia, and Al-
ice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law Emeritus, University of Texas at Austin. I 
am grateful to Kent Piacenti for research assistance. 
** Deputy General Counsel, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty. 
 1. We use the term “church” generically to refer to synagogues, mosques, tem-
ples, and other religious institutions. 
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popular simply because their religion is unpopular—as with Muslims 
after 9/11 and sometimes with other minority faiths. 
But building churches is also a core First Amendment activity.  In 
every major religion, believers gather together for shared rituals and 
communal expressions of faith.  They cannot do so without a physical 
space.  Thus, a restriction on the ability to build a church is a re-
striction on the free exercise of religion. 
The zoning process exists to implement the goals of land-use regu-
lation; the process, and the activists and decision makers within that 
process, often have little concern for the countervailing interests pro-
tected by the First Amendment.  In most cases, the zoning process is 
highly individualized and discretionary.  In most jurisdictions, local 
officials have broad discretion to deny permits and exclude churches 
based on vague standards—such as whether a use is “consistent with 
the character of the neighborhood,” or “consistent with the health, 
safety, and welfare of the community.”  As a result, core First 
Amendment rights are placed at the mercy of a standardless licensing 
system that makes it easy for local officials to disguise regulation of 
churches that is arbitrary, discriminatory, or both. 
To remedy this problem, Congress passed the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).  In nine hearings over 
the course of three years, Congress amassed substantial evidence—
both anecdotal and statistical—of widespread resistance to churches 
in the zoning context, including discrimination against smaller and 
less popular faiths.2  These hearings concerned a broader bill, the 
proposed Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA), that never 
passed.3  RLUIPA was carved out of that bill, passed with over-
 
 2. H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 18–24 (1999) (summarizing hearing record); Doug-
las Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 755, 
769–83 (1999) (reviewing the hearing record); see also 146 CONG. REC. S7774, S7774 
(daily ed. July 27, 2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy) [hereinaf-
ter Hatch-Kennedy Statement] (citing “massive evidence” of widespread discrimina-
tion against churches).  
 3. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-219 (1999) (reporting RLPA to the floor). The Hatch-
Kennedy Statement, supra note 2, was the “Manager’s Statement” on RLUIPA. 146 
Cong. Rec. at S7774.  This Manager’s Statement and committee report, and the many 
committee hearings held on RLPA, are the legislative history of RLUIPA.  The Su-
preme Court has relied on the Manager’s Statement and the hearing record in resolv-
ing a constitutional challenge to the prison provisions of RLUIPA. Cutter v. Wil-
kinson, 544 U.S. 709, 716–17 & n.5 (2005). 
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whelming, bipartisan support,4 and was signed into law by President 
Clinton on September 22, 2000.5 
The land-use section of RLUIPA has four substantive provisions.  
One subsection provides for a form of religious exemption: if a land-
use regulation substantially burdens the free exercise of religion, the 
government must show that that burden serves a compelling interest 
by the least restrictive means.6  Two subsections directly address dis-
crimination: a jurisdiction cannot treat a religious assembly or institu-
tion on less than equal terms with a secular assembly or institution,7 
and it cannot discriminate on the basis of religion or religious denom-
ination.8  And one subsection directly addresses exclusion: land-use 
regulation may not totally exclude religious assemblies9 or unreason-
ably limit religious assemblies, institutions, or structures within a ju-
risdiction.10  The substantial-burden and equal-terms provisions have 
been the most important and generated the most litigation.  A sub-
stantial-burden claim, but not a claim under any of the other sections, 
requires an additional showing to demonstrate congressional authori-
ty to regulate: either an effect on commerce11 or that the land-use 
regulator had authority to make an individualized assessment of the 
proposed use of the property.12  And only the substantial-burden sec-
tion permits a defense of compelling government interest.13 
Since 2000, RLUIPA has become a pillar of civil rights protection 
for churches.  Churches have litigated numerous cases to favorable 
judgment.  Many more have settled.  The Department of Justice 
(DOJ) has filed numerous cases challenging outright discrimination 
against churches.  And RLUIPA has been uniformly and repeatedly 
upheld against constitutional challenge.14 
 
 4. It passed both the House and Senate by unanimous consent. See Bill Sum-
mary & Status 106th Congress (1999–2000) S.2869 All Congressional Actions, 
THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:SN02869:@@@X (last visit-
ed June 1, 2012). 
 5. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000). 
 6. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1) (2006). 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1). 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2). 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(3)(A). 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(3)(B). 
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(B).  
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(C). 
 13. See infra notes 221–26 and accompanying text. 
 14. See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719–26 (2005) (upholding 
RLUIPA’s prisoner provisions against Establishment Clause attack); Westchester 
Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 353–56 (2d Cir. 2007) (upholding 
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Yet some criticisms of RLUIPA persist.  This Article addresses two 
of the most common.  One criticism is that RLUIPA was unneces-
sary.  According to this critique, there is “precious little proof of dis-
crimination” in the land-use context.15  And even if there were, 
churches could sue under the Free Exercise Clause. 
The other common criticism is that RLUIPA dramatically slants 
the playing field in favor of churches, giving them nearly carte 
blanche to ignore local zoning laws.16  According to this criticism, lo-
cal officials have been “terrorized” by religious landowners17 and 
 
RLUIPA’s land use provisions as valid exercise of commerce power, and also reject-
ing attacks based on Tenth Amendment and Establishment Clause); Guru Nanak 
Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 992–95 (9th Cir. 2006) (up-
holding RLUIPA’s land use provisions as valid exercise of Congressional power to 
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment); Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox 
Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 897 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Applications 
(1) and (2) [of RLUIPA] are supported by Congress’s spending and commerce pow-
ers, and (3) codifies Sherbert v. Verner. . . . [C]reation of a federal judicial remedy for 
conduct contrary to [Sherbert’s] doctrine is an uncontroversial use of section 5 [of the 
Fourteenth Amendment].”); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 
1214, 1237–42 (2004) (upholding RLUIPA’s equal-terms provision as valid exercise 
of power to enforce Fourteenth Amendment, and also rejecting attacks based on 
Tenth Amendment and Establishment Clause). 
For substantial-burden claims with an effect on commerce, RLUIPA’s standards 
need not be based on constitutional standards, although they are.  For equal-terms, 
discrimination, and exclusion or limitation claims, and for substantial-burden claims 
with no demonstrated effect on commerce, RLUIPA’s reach must be proportionate 
and congruent to judicial interpretations of constitutional rights. City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).  As the cases cited in the first paragraph of this note 
illustrate, the courts have properly held that it is.  RLUIPA’s specific standards are 
closely tied to judicial interpretations of the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses. 
See Hatch-Kennedy Statement, supra note 2, at S7775–76; H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 
28–29 (1999); Cong. Rec. E1563 (daily ed., Sept. 22, 2000) (remarks of Mr. Canady).  
The congressional findings and hearing record and the close tracking of judicial in-
terpretations of the clauses all show that “many of the laws affected by” RLUIPA 
“have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional.” City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 
532.  The constitutional standard is “many,” not necessarily all, and “significant like-
lihood,” not necessarily certainty. 
 15. Marci Hamilton, The Federal Government’s Intervention on Behalf of Reli-
gious Entities in Local Land Use Disputes: Why it’s a Terrible Idea, FINDLAW (Nov. 
6, 2003), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20031106.html. 
 16. Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, The Genesis of RLUIPA and Federalism: 
Evaluating the Creation of a Federal Statutory Right and Its Impact on Local Gov-
ernment, 40 URB. LAW. 195, 256 (2008) (“RLUIPA has not leveled the playing field 
for certain groups who might face discrimination, but rather it is [sic] has given reli-
gious groups almost free reign [sic] to control community development in the name 
of religious exercise.”). 
 17. Marci Hamilton, The Circus that Is RLUIPA: How the Land-Use Law that 
Favors Religious Landowners Is Introducing Chaos into the Local Land Use Process, 
FINDLAW (Nov. 30, 2006), http:// writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20061130.html. 
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have begun to “rubber stamp” any new religious development, to the 
detriment of local communities.18 
Both of these criticisms are unfounded.  As explained in Part I, 
twelve years of precedent show that RLUIPA was and is needed.  
Churches continue to face hostility and discrimination in the zoning 
context, and RLUIPA rightly assists courts in bringing the First 
Amendment to bear. 
As explained in Part II, RLUIPA does not give churches carte 
blanche to ignore zoning regulations.  Rather, most courts have rea-
sonably interpreted RLUIPA to require cities to make adequate 
property available for churches.  But churches still lose when they 
overreach. 
As explained in Part III, RLUIPA is actually somewhat under-
enforced.  Some judges have shown a reluctance to strike down local 
zoning decisions under a federal law—either because of their faith in 
the local zoning process, their commitment to federalism, or their 
hostility to religious exemptions.  Thus, in important ways and in 
many courtrooms, RLUIPA still falls short of providing full protec-
tion for First Amendment rights. 
I.  THE NEED FOR RLUIPA 
Some scholars have criticized RLUIPA as unnecessary.  But nu-
merous cases show that churches continue to face hostility in the zon-
ing context.  It is easy to hide that hostility, given the highly discre-
tionary nature of zoning decisions.  Thus, RLUIPA has helped courts 
ferret out hostility and protect the First Amendment rights of church-
es. 
A. Religious or Racial Hostility 
In some areas of the country, some churches are unpopular be-
cause of religious or racial discrimination.  Many cases show that dis-
crimination remains a significant problem. 
The most obvious example is widespread hostility to Muslim 
mosques.  In 2010, a proposal to build an Islamic community center 
near (not at or on) Ground Zero gained nationwide attention and 
 
 18. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 16, at 252 (quoting Press Release, Office of Hon. 
Patrick Withers, Legislator Withers Demands Changes in Religious Land Use Law 
(Jan. 11, 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. at 256 (claiming that 
RLUIPA “has proven to be a nightmare for local government officials and for com-
munities”). 
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significant opposition.19  But that was only the most high-profile dis-
pute.  In the last three years, the Pew Research Center has docu-
mented community resistance to thirty-seven different mosques or Is-
lamic centers.20  Often, the resistance is phrased in terms of concerns 
about traffic, parking, noise, or property values, but sometimes the 
resistance is overtly anti-Islamic.21  When this Article was presented, 
all three speakers agreed that there is discrimination against Mus-
lims.22 
Muslims are not the only religious group that faces hostility.  Or-
thodox Jews, and especially Hasidic Jews, have also faced strong re-
sistance in many communities.  In part, this is because Orthodox Jews 
must live within walking distance of their synagogue in order to com-
ply with religious rules concerning the Sabbath, so they tend to cluster 
in a particular neighborhood.  Sometimes this clustering is viewed as a 
threat—because Hasidic Jews are sometimes viewed as cultural out-
siders, as not supporting the public schools, or as exercising undue po-
 
 19. Brown v. N.Y.C. Landmarks Pres. Comm’n, Nos. 110334/2010 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
filed Aug. 4, 2010) (a lawsuit filed by the American Center for Law and Justice that 
sought to prevent construction of the Islamic community center in lower Manhattan); 
Eric Treene, RLUIPA and Mosques: Enforcing a Fundamental Right in Challenging 
Times, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 330 (2012) (reviewing mosque disputes and anti-
Muslim violence around the country); Laurie Goodstein, Across Nation, Mosque 
Projects Meet Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2010, at A1. 
 20. Controversies Over Mosques and Islamic Centers Across the U.S., PEW RE-
SEARCH CTR.’S FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE (Sept. 29, 2011), http://features. 
pewforum.org/muslim/assets/mosque-map-all-text%209-29-11.pdf (last visited June 1, 
2012) [hereinafter PEW RESEARCH CTR.]; see also Map—Nationwide Anti-Mosque 
Activity, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.aclu.org/maps/map-nationwide-
anti-mosque-activity (last visited June 1, 2012) (collecting reports of vandalism, ar-
son, and similar attacks on mosques).   
 21. PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 20, at 1; see also Hatch-Kennedy Statement, 
supra note 2, at S7774 (“Sometimes, zoning board members or neighborhood resi-
dents explicitly offer race or religion as the reason to exclude a proposed church, es-
pecially in cases of black churches and Jewish shuls and synagogues. More often, dis-
crimination lurks behind such vague and universally applicable reasons as traffic, 
aesthetics, or ‘not consistent with the city’s land use plan.’”). 
 22. See The Impact of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 
on States and Local Governments (Jan. 7, 2012), http://www.aals.org/am2012/pod 
casts/7_A15b_R21_STATEANDLOCALGVTLAW_Edited.mp3 [hereinafter Re-
cording of Oral Presentations] (“Across our culture we have pervasive discrimination 
against Islam.” (Prof. Hamilton at about 20:30)); id. (“There often is unfortunately 
opposition that is actually or apparently motivated by religious prejudice or some-
times also racial or ethnic prejudice.  And I fully agree that the religious institutions 
that face this are mosques, synagogues—doesn’t matter if it’s Orthodox or not—
Buddhist and Hindu temples, non-white Christian churches, and to a somewhat lesser 
extent, evangelical churches.  I think that is absolutely clear.” (Prof. Weinstein at 
about 47:35)). 
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litical clout by voting as a bloc.  Thus, some communities have op-
posed the location of a new Orthodox synagogue for fear that Ortho-
dox Jews will move in and take over the community. 
One example is Rockland County, New York, where Orthodox 
Jews have faced bitter opposition and have had to file numerous 
RLUIPA lawsuits.  In LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher,23 which pre-
dates the enactment of RLUIPA, the court found ample evidence to 
support a jury finding that the Village of Airmont was created for the 
express purpose of excluding Hasidic Jews.  More recently, in United 
States v. Village of Airmont,24 the Department of Justice alleged that 
the Village enacted a ban on boarding schools with the specific mo-
tive to keep out Hasidic Jews, who educate their young men in board-
ing schools called yeshivas.  After a federal court rejected the Vil-
lage’s motion to dismiss, the Village settled the case by agreeing to 
amend its zoning code and permit a yeshiva.25  Rockland County may 
be unique in the frequency and persistence of efforts to exclude Or-
thodox Jews, but there are similar disputes in smaller numbers else-
where.26  Other minority faiths have also faced a disproportionate 
 
 23. 67 F.3d 412, 430–31 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 24. U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE RELI-
GIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT 8 (2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/rluipa_report_092210.pdf [hereinafter TENTH ANNIVER-
SARY REPORT]; see also Congregation Mischknois Lavier Yakov, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of 
Airmont, 301 F. App’x 14 (2d Cir. 2008) (refusing to vacate consent decree with pri-
vate plaintiff allowing construction of a residential school). 
 25. See Consent Decree, United States v. Vill. of Airmont, No. 05-cv-5520 (LAK) 
(PED) (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2011), ECF No. 53, available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/ 
about/hce/documents/airmontsettle.pdf; see also Bikur Cholim, Inc. v. Vill. of Suf-
fern, 664 F. Supp. 2d 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (challenging another Rockland County vil-
lage’s refusal to permit a guest house within walking distance of hospital where ob-
servant Jews could stay when visiting the sick).  Much other RLUIPA litigation in 
Rockland County is unreported; both sides agree that the volume of such litigation is 
large. See Roman P. Storzer, Testimony Before the Rockland County Legislature 
(Mar. 18, 2008), available at http://www.storzerandgreene.com/images/www.tartikov 
college.com.pdf (“Zoning laws have been used in the County time and time again to 
discriminate against and burden the religious exercise of an identifiable group that 
constitutes a substantial minority of the population: Hasidic Jews.”); The Religious 
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) and Ramapo’s Adult Student 
Housing (ASH) Law, PRESERVE RAMAPO, http://www.preserveramapo.org/RLUIPA 
%20and%20ASH/RLUIPA%20and%20ASH%20Content%20Page.htm (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2012) (offering commentary on numerous disputes from perspective of 
strong opposition to RLUIPA). 
 26. See Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 344, 357 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (ordering Village to permit construction of additional classroom building 
on School’s largely undeveloped twenty-six-acre tract); Konikov v. Orange Cnty., 410 
F.3d 1317, 1328 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding equal-terms violation in enforcement action 
against rabbi for holding prayer services in his home, where enforcement officers tes-
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share of opposition in the zoning context.  Several prominent cases 
have involved Sikhs27 or Buddhists.28 
Another example is Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal 
(UDV), a Brazilian-based religion that uses a mildly hallucinogenic 
tea in its services.29  The church’s legal right to practice this sacrament 
has been vindicated in the district court, the court of appeals, and 8-0 
in the Supreme Court of the United States,30 but the church has now 
been forced to start over in RLUIPA litigation.31  The county refused 
permission to build a place of worship on 2.5 acres in a lightly devel-
oped semi-rural area, and it clearly indicated that the church will nev-
er be permitted to build anywhere in the county.32  The county seeks 
 
tified that groups could gather in residences two to three times a week for secular 
purposes but not for religious purposes); Congregation Etz Chaim v. City of Los An-
geles, No. CV 10-1587 CAS (Ex) (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2011) (finding substantial-
burden and equal-terms violations; this case is further discussed infra notes 263–304 
and accompanying text); Chabad of Nova, Inc. v. City of Cooper City, 575 F. Supp. 
2d 1280, 1291 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (finding that City had unreasonably limited places of 
religious assembly and made it essentially impossible for new churches or synagogues 
to locate in city); Hollywood Cmty. Synagogue, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 436 F. 
Supp. 2d 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (finding constitutional violation where City denied 
special exception because synagogue was “too controversial”); Hollywood Cmty. 
Synagogue, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1296, 1315 (S.D. Fla. 2006) 
(finding “ample evidence of a City policy and practice of harassment and selective 
enforcement against the Synagogue”); Chabad Chevra, LLC v. City of Hartford, No. 
CV1060038475, 2011 WL 7029763 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 15, 2011) (vacating order to 
cease and desist religious use following sale of building, and concluding that “the only 
apparent distinction between the activities of the prior owner and Chabad Chevra is 
their religion, Christianity and Judaism.”). 
 27. Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 981–82 
(9th Cir. 2006).  Guru Nanak is discussed infra note 63 and accompanying text, as an 
example of NIMBY opposition. 
 28. Vietnamese Buddhism Study Temple in Am. v. City of Garden Grove, 460 F. 
Supp. 2d 1165 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (granting preliminary injunction against apparent fa-
cial violation of RLUIPA’s equal-terms provision); Cambodian Buddhist Soc’y of 
Conn., Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n of Newtown, 941 A.2d 868, 873 (Conn. 
2008) (interpreting RLUIPA not to apply).  Cambodian Buddhist is further discussed 
infra notes 166–73 and accompanying text as an example of under-enforcement. 
 29. Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 
423 (2006). 
 30. O Centro Espírita Beneficiente União do Vegetal v. Ashcroft, 282 F. Supp. 2d 
1236 (D.N.M. 2002), aff’d, 342 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2003), aff’d en banc, 389 F.3d 973 
(10th Cir. 2004), aff’d sub nom., Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do 
Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
 31. Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Judgment, and Damages, O 
Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, No. 12-cv-
00105 (D.N.M. Feb. 2, 2012), ECF No. 1. 
 32. See UDV Temple, Case No. MP/PDP 09-5300, ¶¶ 31–40 (Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs of Santa Fe Cnty. 2011), available at http://www.co.santa-fe.nm.us/docu 
ments/agendas/packet_materials/XIA1and2.pdf (denying the application on multiple 
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to use its zoning power to effectively ban a religion whose right to ex-
ist has been expressly affirmed by the highest Court in the land. 
Christians sometimes also draw a hostile reaction.  Sometimes it is 
because they are on one end of the country’s political spectrum and 
are unpopular with their political opponents.  Other times it is be-
cause the congregation consists of ethnic or racial minorities.  In West 
Mifflin, Pennsylvania, for example, a predominantly white Baptist 
church sold its building to a predominantly black Baptist church, but 
the city refused to issue an occupancy permit to the new owners.  The 
city granted the permit only after DOJ opened an investigation under 
RLUIPA.33  Similarly, when a predominantly African-American con-
gregation sought to move into Rockaway Township, New Jersey, 
which is 89% white, the town passed a new zoning provision blocking 
part of the church’s plans.  After the church sued, and DOJ opened 
an investigation, the town permitted the church to proceed.34 
Of course, not all cases involve hostility to racial or religious mi-
norities.  But a substantial fraction of cases do.  Jews, Muslims, Bud-
dhists, and Hindus constitute only about 3% of the United States 
population.35  But in the first ten years under RLUIPA, they repre-
sented 34% of DOJ’s caseload.36  Cases involving racial-minority 
Christian congregations represented another 30%.37  Thus, 64% of all 
DOJ investigations involved racial or religious minorities.  A pre-
RLUIPA study of church zoning disputes that produced reported 
opinions found similar disparities.38 
Religious hostility is especially problematic in the zoning process 
because it is easy to mask, and officials of course have strong incen-
 
grounds, mostly relating to the church’s use of the tea, and concluding that “Santa Fe 
has a compelling interest in not setting a precedent that transforms it into a mecca for 
drug use.”). (Two decisions are reported at this URL; scroll down seven pages to find 
the UDV decision.) 
 33. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN FOCUS (U. S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., 
Wash., D.C.), Feb. 2004, available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/spec_topics/religious 
discrimination/newsletter/focus_1.htm.  
 34. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN FOCUS (U. S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div., 
Wash., D.C.), Mar. 2007, available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/spec_topics/religious 
discrimination/newsletter/focus_23.htm. 
 35. Barry A. Kosmin & Ariela Keysar, American Religious Identification Survey, 
INST. FOR THE STUDY OF SECULARISM IN SOC’Y & CULTURE 5, tbl.3 (2009), http:// 
commons.trincoll.edu/aris/files/2011/08/ARIS_Report_2008.pdf.  
 36. See TENTH ANNIVERSARY REPORT, supra note 24, at 6. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See Von G. Keetch & Matthew K. Richards, The Need for Legislation to En-
shrine Free Exercise in the Land Use Context, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 725, 729–30, 
736–42 (1999). 
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tives to mask it.  Zoning ordinances often require churches to obtain 
a special-use permit, and special-use permits are often subject to 
vague conditions or to the broad discretion of local officials.39  Thus, 
hostile officials can reject churches based on unsubstantiated con-
cerns about traffic, parking, noise, or property values.  Or they can re-
ject churches based on vague concerns about the “character of the 
neighborhood,” or “general welfare.”40  Either way, religious hostility 
can be very hard to detect.  And judicial review under ordinary state 
zoning law is highly deferential in most states.41 
Moxley v. Town of Walkersville42 provides an example of how the 
special permit process can be misused.  There, a group of Ahmadiyya 
Muslims sought to purchase a 224-acre farm in the agricultural zone 
of Walkersville, Maryland.43  They planned to build a mosque for ap-
proximately twenty local families and a residence for the imam and 
groundskeeper.44  The two buildings would have covered only 6.7% 
of the property.45  They also wanted to hold an annual religious event 
that would use an additional 26.7% of the property three days per 
year.46  Churches were permitted in agricultural zones by special ex-
ception, and the Muslim group applied for one.47 
Although a staff report concluded that the use was consistent with 
the agricultural area, the zoning board unanimously rejected the ap-
plication, eventually citing concerns about traffic, water, sewage, and 
fire and rescue.48  During the same period, however, the zoning board 
approved a larger school on a smaller parcel in an agricultural area.49  
The board also permitted an annual carnival that was larger than the 
 
 39. See Laycock, supra note 2, at 764–65. 
 40. Id. at 776.   
 41. See 8 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 44.02[4][a] 
(2008) (“In reviewing board actions as to special exceptions the courts do not make 
new or substitute judgments, but restrict themselves to determining whether there 
has been illegality, arbitrariness, or abuse of discretion; in other words, whether the 
findings and order of the local agency are against the manifest weight of the evi-
dence.”). 
 42. 601 F. Supp. 2d 648 (D. Md. 2009). 
 43. Id. at 652. 
 44. Id. at 653. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 656. 
 49. Id. at 655 n.5. 
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Muslim group’s event just 200 yards from the Muslim group’s proper-
ty.50 
Was this a case of religious discrimination?  We certainly think so, 
but that is hard to prove.  In the lawsuit, the owner of the farm al-
leged that three of the town commissioners held private meetings 
with local residents to strategize about how to keep the Muslims out 
without violating RLUIPA.51  Citizens and local officials were also 
quoted in various media outlets as expressing great hostility toward 
Muslims.52  But the denial of a special exception was easy to justify 
under the highly discretionary zoning code; it would be hard to pre-
dict the outcome of a lawsuit under state law, and hard to be entirely 
confident of proving discrimination directly under the Constitution.  
But in response to a lawsuit alleging both constitutional violations 
and RLUIPA violations, the town settled by buying the land, paying 
more than its annual budget to make the Muslim group go away.53 
As this case illustrates, RLUIPA cases can include counts directly 
under the Free Exercise Clause, just as they could before RLUIPA.  
RLUIPA adds two things that have made an important difference.  
First, RLUIPA has translated the majestic generality of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause into more specific standards tailored to the land-use 
context.  These specific standards focus the attention of judges and lit-
igators and simplify the proof required to make out a claim.  The 
church no longer has to explain to a skeptical judge how a case about 
a zoning decision is analogous to a case about animal sacrifice.54 
Second, and perhaps even more important, RLUIPA is based on 
an extensive hearing record in which Congress found a widespread 
pattern of arbitrary or discriminatory zoning of churches.  The specif-
ic statutory standards, and especially the Congressional findings and 
hearing record, have educated judges to take these claims seriously.  
In pre-RLUIPA free exercise cases, judges saw one claim at a time 
against a background of zoning regulation that was presumed to be 
fair and neutral.  But Congress was able to look at a broad range of 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 654, 663. 
 52. Id. at 654–55. 
 53. Ron Cassie, Walkersville to Borrow $800K Toward Purchase of Moxley Farm, 
FREDERICK NEWS POST (Oct. 30, 2009), http://www.fredericknewspost.com/sections/ 
news/display.htm?StoryID=97142 (describing annual operating budget of $3 million 
and purchase price of $4.71 million). 
 54. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993). 
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church zoning cases and reveal the pattern of widespread hostility to 
churches. 
B. NIMBY Resistance 
Even in the absence of anti-religious animus, churches are often 
subject to NIMBY resistance—the classic land-use demand to build 
somewhere else, but Not In My Back Yard.  Nearby residents often 
cite concerns about increased traffic and noise, environmental harms, 
loss of open space or farmland, aesthetics, or general loss of property 
values. 
Although many land uses face opposition for the same reasons, 
churches are especially vulnerable.  A new movie theater, grocery 
store, or Walmart can expect at least some support from residents 
who expect to patronize it, be employed by it, or gain tax revenue 
from it.  But the vast majority of residents know they will never at-
tend a proposed new church.  Some are already committed to another 
church; others have no interest in attending any church.  Thus, for 
most residents, any cost from a new church, however small, exceeds 
the expected benefit.55 
So residents or local officials say things like: “No family wants to 
live near a religious temple with all the excessive crowds, traffic, and 
noise;”56 “what I hear from residents is that they don’t feel like these 
churches are being an asset to the community;”57 and “there will nev-
er be another mega church . . . in Boulder County.”58  This Boulder 
County official openly stated a policy of total exclusion of an im-
portant category of churches.  But the less dramatic sentiments, when 
generalized, also lead toward a de facto policy of deliberate exclusion.  
If churches are not an asset, and if no one wants to live near them, 
then they cannot go anywhere.  The problem with NIMBY objections 
is that everywhere is someone’s backyard. 
A classic example of a NIMBY case is Westchester Day School v. 
Village of Mamaroneck.59 There, a Jewish day school applied for a 
 
 55. See Laycock, supra note 2, at 759. 
 56. Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 992 n.19 
(9th Cir. 2006) (finding violation of RLUIPA’s substantial-burden provision). 
 57. Reaching Hearts Int’l, Inc. v. Prince George’s Cnty., 584 F. Supp. 2d 766, 782 
(D. Md. 2008) (upholding jury finding of actual motive of religious discrimination 
against Seventh-day Adventist congregation), aff’d, 368 F. App’x 370 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 58. Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 613 F.3d 1229, 
1238 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding violations of RLUIPA’s equal-terms and unreasonable-
limitation provisions). 
 59. 504 F.3d 338 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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permit to expand its facilities.  In response to “intense and unrelent-
ing pressure from politically well-connected neighboring residents,” 
the zoning board denied the permit, citing concerns about traffic, 
parking, aesthetics, and intensity of use.60  But after a seven-day 
bench trial, the district judge found that the stated concerns were un-
supported by the evidence and that the permit denial was “arbitrary 
and capricious.”61  After the court of appeals affirmed, the city settled 
the claims for $4.75 million.62 
Another example of NIMBY opposition is Guru Nanak Sikh Socie-
ty v. County of Sutter.63  There, a Sikh group sought a permit to build 
a temple on two acres in a low-density residential area.64  The plan-
ning division recommended granting the permit, but the planning 
commission voted unanimously to reject it, citing neighbors’ concerns 
about noise and traffic.65  So the Sikh group bought a twenty-nine-
acre parcel in a rural area and applied again.66  This time, the commis-
sion granted the permit, but the county board of supervisors unani-
mously withdrew it, based on concerns about “leapfrog development” 
and a desire to maintain agricultural land.67  So first the Sikhs pro-
posed building too close to their neighbors (noise and traffic), and 
then they proposed building too far from their neighbors (“leapfrog 
development”).  Where were they supposed to go?  The Ninth Circuit 
held that “[t]he net effect of the County’s two denials” was to “shrink 
the large amount of land theoretically available to Guru Nanak under 
the Zoning Code to several scattered parcels that the County may or 
may not ultimately approve.”68 
Similarly, in Reaching Hearts International, Inc. v. Prince George’s 
County,69 a Seventh-day Adventist congregation purchased property 
intending to build a church and related facilities.  Although churches 
were permitted in the zoning district as a matter of right, the county 
denied permission to change the property’s sewer and water classifi-
 
 60. Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 417 F. Supp. 2d 477, 536, 551–
54, 564–68, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 61. Id. at 569. 
 62. Settlement in Mamaroneck, J. NEWS (Westchester County), Jan. 15, 2008, at 
B6.  
 63. 456 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 64. Id. at 981–82. 
 65. Id. at 982. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 973–84, 990. 
 68. Id. at 991–92. 
 69. 584 F. Supp. 2d 766 (D. Md. 2008), aff’d, 368 F. App’x 370 (4th Cir. 2010) 
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cation, thus blocking the church.70  “Many other properties received 
approval for sewer and water reclassifications in 2003 and 2005, but 
Reaching Hearts—the only church property—was denied such a re-
classification.”71 
After a seven-day trial, the jury awarded $3.7 million in damages to 
the church, and expressly found religious discrimination on a special 
verdict.72  As the district judge explained in upholding the verdict: 
As here, it is not common for land use decision-makers to expressly 
offer religion as their reason to exclude a church. As noted by Sena-
tors Hatch and Kennedy, “[m]ore often, discrimination lurks behind 
such vague and universally applicable reasons as traffic, aesthetics, 
or ‘not consistent with the city’s land use plan,’” and unfortunately 
these “forms of discrimination are very widespread.” . . . Here, a jury 
reasonably concluded that religious discrimination was afoot, and 
this Court sees no reason to disturb that finding.73 
As the court indicated, local officials disclaimed any anti-religious 
animus.  Instead, they couched their objections in NIMBY terms: 
“[The Council] do[es]n’t oppose churches, the concern we have is that 
sometimes churches eat up a lot of land that could be used for other 
things.”74  “[W]e are losing tax money and retail and increasingly, 
churches are requiring more space.”75  This was the case in which a 
defendant official said that “what I hear from residents is that they 
don’t feel like these churches are being an asset to the community.”76 
Another prominent NIMBY case is Rocky Mountain Christian 
Church v. Board of County Commissioners of Boulder County.77  
There, a growing evangelical Christian church and school sought to 
expand its campus in a rural part of Boulder County.78  The county 
rejected most of the church’s proposal, citing concerns about in-
creased traffic, loss of open space, and “the welfare of the residents of 
Boulder County.”79  After a twelve-day trial, a jury found that the 
 
 70. 368 F. App’x at 371. 
 71. Id.  
 72. 584 F. Supp. 2d at 780. 
 73. Id. at 784 (quoting Hatch-Kennedy Statement, supra note 2, at S7774–75).  
 74. Id. at 782. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. 613 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2010). 
 78. Id. at 1234. 
 79. Id. 
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county had violated RLUIPA’s equal-terms provision by treating the 
church worse than a nearby private school.80 
When these Articles were presented, Professor Hamilton said that 
“most of the opposition in a—to a new religious use or expansion is 
probably NIMBY.  But I defend NIMBY.”81  She made a similar 
point, somewhat less explicitly, in an earlier Article.82  Defending 
NIMBY gives property owners an effective veto over the use of any 
nearby property, and any effect of a new use, however modest or tan-
gential, may lead them to use that veto.  In this view, an additional 
hundred cars a day is “a seismic change” to residential owners.83  So 
local officials should always be permitted to exclude churches when 
neighbors object. 
There are many problems with this argument; we will note here the 
three most important.  First, giving neighbors a veto over the location 
of churches means that an exercise of constitutional rights is subjected 
to the standardless whim of neighbors who are under no obligation to 
adhere to any rules or to give any weight whatever to the free exer-
cise of religion. 
Second, if NIMBY objections are always a legitimate basis for ex-
cluding churches, then churches can always be excluded—because 
neighbors can always find or imagine a reason to object.  As the cases 
described above illustrate, no lot is large enough, no site is isolated 
enough, no traffic impact is small enough, to avoid the NIMBY objec-
tions of neighbors who want no new development and certainly no 
new development from someone else’s religion.  If generalized into 
policy, deference to NIMBY objections would result in total exclusion 
of churches.  But churches have a First Amendment right to exist and 
to exercise their religions, and therefore, they must have a First 
Amendment right to be located somewhere. 
 
 80. Id. at 1235–36. 
 81. Recording of Oral Presentations, supra note 22, at 1:29:00. 
 82. Marci Hamilton, Struggling with Churches as Neighbors: Land Use Conflicts 
Between Religious Institutions and Those Who Reside Nearby, FINDLAW (Jan. 17, 
2002), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/Hamilton/20020117.html (“Short of the extremely 
rare example in which true religious discrimination occurs, towns and cities must 
have the latitude to zone real property in the best interest of all. If that means zoning 
religious buildings’ new intensive uses out of residential districts, the Constitution is 
not violated . . . . There can be no constitutional right for this new breed of houses of 
worship to claim locations in the midst residential [sic]. At a minimum, local commu-
nities should have the power to place restrictions on hours and occupancy to keep the 
new uses in tempo with the residential neighborhood.”). 
 83. MARCI HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW 
101 (2005). 
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Third, given the discretion inherent in the zoning process, it is very 
difficult to tell when NIMBY complaints are legitimate, when they 
are exaggerated expressions of opposition to all new development, 
and when they are a pretext for anti-religious animus.  Such animus 
raises First Amendment concerns in a way that anti-freeway animus 
or anti-Walmart animus does not.  Thus, where First Amendment 
rights are at stake, RLUIPA rightly requires closer scrutiny of 
NIMBY complaints.  And as the trials discussed above have shown, 
NIMBY complaints often serve as a pretext for hostile and unequal 
treatment of churches. 
C.  Taxes and Commerce 
Churches also face hostility in the zoning context because they are 
tax exempt, and local officials do not like taking property off the tax 
rolls.  Some opponents of RLUIPA have argued that tax revenue is a 
perfectly permissible, and indeed compelling, land-use interest.  But if 
that were so, then even more clearly than with NIMBY objections, 
there would be grounds to exclude any new church from any jurisdic-
tion in the country.  Existing churches would be grandfathered in, and 
no new church could ever form. 
The classic tax-base case is Cottonwood Christian Center v. Cy-
press Redevelopment Agency.84  There, a large Christian church as-
sembled an eighteen-acre site from six smaller and undeveloped 
properties.85  But once the larger site had been assembled, the city de-
cided that it wanted a Costco instead, and it therefore denied the 
church a permit and sought to condemn the property.86  In response 
to a lawsuit under RLUIPA, the city argued that it had a compelling 
governmental interest in generating tax revenue.87  The court rejected 
that argument, for the obvious and generally applicable reason that 
“[i]f revenue generation were a compelling state interest, municipali-
ties could exclude all religious institutions from their cities.”88 
Churches also face opposition on the closely related ground that 
they put a damper on commercial or entertainment districts.  Accord-
ing to many land-use planners, it would be “very undesirable for a 
large church to displace sales tax generating business/commercial 
property with our required parking and buildings and have a giant 
 
 84. 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
 85. Id. at 1212–13. 
 86. Id. at 1214–15. 
 87. Id. at 1228. 
 88. Id. 
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‘hole’ in a retail area that is relatively empty six days a week.”89  
Somewhat ironically, this quotation is from a letter from a pastor at-
tempting to persuade the city to at least let his church locate in a 
manufacturing district.  But cities routinely make variations on this 
argument in RLUIPA cases involving property in commercial zones.  
Thus, churches are unwanted in rural and residential districts because 
they generate too much traffic, and unwanted in commercial districts 
because they generate too little.90  Once again, the bottom line is that 
churches can be excluded everywhere. 
One example is Elijah Group, Inc. v. City of Leon Valley.91  There, 
a city banned churches from a retail corridor, in part because they are 
“relatively empty six days a week.”92  But the terms of the city’s zon-
ing code did not fit its alleged government interest, because the city 
permitted the church to use the site five days a week as a daycare cen-
ter.93  So the only direct effect of the ban on churches was to ensure 
that the building remained empty on Sundays.  Perhaps the city also 
assumed that the church could not afford two sites, so that barring 
Sunday use would also force the church to close the daycare center.  
The city permitted a variety of other non-retail uses in the retail cor-
ridor, including private clubs.94  The Fifth Circuit held that the ban on 
churches violated RLUIPA’s equal-terms provision, because it could 
not be squared with the city’s more favorable treatment of private 
clubs.95 
Similarly, in Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of 
Yuma,96 the city sought to revive its main street with a “mixture of 
commercial, cultural, governmental, and residential uses that will help 
to ensure a lively pedestrian-oriented district.”97  Churches were per-
 
 89. Vineyard Christian Fellowship of Evanston, Inc. v. City of Evanston, 250 F. 
Supp. 2d 961, 967 (N.D. Ill. 2003). 
 90. Hatch-Kennedy Statement, supra note 2, at S7774–75 (“Churches have been 
excluded from residential zones because they generate too much traffic, and from 
commercial zones because they don’t generate enough traffic.”). 
 91. 643 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 92. Defendant’s Response to Plaintiff’s Objections to Magistrate’s Report and 
Recommendation at 11, Elijah Group, Inc. v. City of Leon Valley, No. SA-08-CV-
0907 OG (NN), 2009 WL 3247996 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2009), ECF No. 45 (quoting 
Vineyard Christian, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 967).   
 93. Elijah Group, 643 F.3d at 421. 
 94. Id. at 424. 
 95. Id. 
 96. 651 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 97. Id. at 1165. 
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mitted only with a conditional-use permit.98  When a church sought to 
occupy a large, vacant building that had once served as factory and 
warehouse, the city refused a permit, preferring “a vacant hulk” to a 
church.99  As the Ninth Circuit explained: “This is a sort of reverse 
urban blight case, with the twist that instead of bars and nightclubs 
being treated as blighting their more genteel environs, the church is 
treated as blighting the bar and nightclub district.”100 
There was one potentially difficult issue lurking in the case: no liq-
uor license could be issued within 300 feet of a church.101  And under 
Supreme Court precedent, the church is not allowed to waive the re-
striction, lest it acquire de facto control over part of the city’s zoning 
authority.102  RLUIPA’s equal-terms provision requires that churches 
be allowed to locate in the entertainment district if secular places of 
public assembly could locate there,103 but the state restriction on liq-
uor licenses would then prevent any new establishments with liquor 
licenses from locating there.  The combination of state law and Su-
preme Court precedent created an automatic and non-waivable 
NIMBY power in the church that was inconsistent with the policy of 
RLUIPA.  These laws separating bars from churches were enacted in 
an era—the Arizona provision appears to date from 1950104—when 
churches were favored uses and when it never occurred to anyone 
that churches would someday have trouble finding places to worship.  
RLUIPA responds to a new problem and enacts a different policy: 
churches are entitled to locate where secular places of assembly can 
locate, and they can move in next to bars if they choose.  We agree 
that a church that so chooses should not then be able to veto all new 
liquor licenses in the neighborhood. 
The Ninth Circuit held that excluding the church violated 
RLUIPA.  The liquor-license problem was of the state’s own crea-
tion, and the state solved it by authorizing the city to waive the 300-
foot restriction.105  But even apart from the liquor-license issue, there 
 
 98. Id. at 1166. 
 99. Id. at 1165–66. 
 100. Id. at 1165. 
 101. Id. at 1166. 
 102. Larkin v. Grendel’s Den Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982). 
 103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2006). 
 104. Act Relating to Liquor Licenses and Control, ch. 60, § 5, 1951 Ariz. Sess. 
Laws 671, 677.  Although it was published in the 1951 Session Laws, this Act was 
passed in the 1950 First Special Session. 
 105. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-207(C)(4) (West 2010); Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d 
at 1167 n.10. 
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were serious problems with the city’s argument.  First, the city’s ordi-
nance treated not just churches but all religious organizations worse 
than nonreligious membership organizations, regardless of their effect 
on liquor licenses.106  Second, the city permitted many uses as of right 
that “would have [had] the same practical effect as a church of blight-
ing a potential block of bars and nightclubs”—including apartment 
buildings, post offices, and even prisons.107  Thus, the city’s alleged 
commercial concerns did not justify excluding the church. 
By contrast, two other circuits have upheld the exclusion of 
churches based on commercial concerns.108  We discuss these cases 
below when we consider the underenforcement of RLUIPA. 
D. Collective Action 
All of these factors—religious hostility, NIMBY resistance, and 
objections based on taxes and commerce—combine to make churches 
a uniquely disfavored land use.  Residential neighbors do not like 
churches because they fear that churches will create traffic or noise, 
or harm property values; local officials do not like churches because 
they do not pay taxes; and land-use planners do not like churches be-
cause they allegedly disrupt residential, retail, commercial, or enter-
tainment districts.  Beyond that, the vast majority of residents antici-
pate no benefit from a new church, and some residents may be openly 
hostile. 
Very few land uses come with all of these “problems.”  Movie thea-
ters and auditoriums create traffic and noise like churches (often far 
more frequently), but they generate tax revenue and are viewed as 
contributing to a commercial or retail district.  Schools create traffic 
and do not pay taxes, but they are viewed as necessary assets to the 
community.  Churches, by contrast, are uniquely unwanted in the 
zoning process. 
This widespread resistance to churches results in a collective action 
problem.  If one suburb is open to churches, and its near neighbors 
are not, the open suburb may become overloaded.  The perception is 
that too many churches will move in, reducing the tax base and upset-
ting local residents.  Thus, the incentive is for every jurisdiction to ex-
clude at least as much as neighboring jurisdictions, and maybe a little 
 
 106. Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1174. 
 107. Id. at 1174–75. 
 108. See River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (en banc); Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism v. City of Long Branch, 510 
F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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more.109  Not every jurisdiction succumbs to these forces, but many 
do.  No one has ever claimed that land-use regulation is hostile to 
churches in every local jurisdiction in the United States.  But hostile 
land-use regulation is a serious problem where it exists, and it exists 
in many places. 
Opponents of RLUIPA have dismissed the congressional hearing 
record on the basis of data reported in an article by Mark Chaves and 
William Tsitsos.110  Scholars more neutral111 or friendly112 towards 
RLUIPA have also cited this data.  Chaves and Tsitsos report that of 
all congregations in their sample who sought any kind of permit or li-
cense from a government body, only one percent were denied.113  But 
this interesting statistic is irrelevant to RLUIPA, because only two 
percent of these applications involved zoning.114  Professor Chaves 
and his team simply were not able to study zoning applications, and 
what they did study casts no light on the zoning issue.  Permits for 
carnivals, spaghetti suppers, or bingo games, and building permits for 
interior renovations or modest exterior additions like a new porch or 
a wheelchair ramp, do not draw the same political opposition and do 
not go through the same regulatory process as zoning applications.  A 
building project that requires a conditional-use permit is fundamen-
tally different from one that does not.  This and other serious difficul-
ties in applying the Chaves data to RLUIPA were explained to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee during the RLPA hearings.115  Nothing 
 
 109. Cf. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1221–22 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (town arguing that allowing churches in the business district would erode 
the tax base, make it more difficult to compete for businesses with a nearby town, 
and threaten the economic stability of the town). 
 110. Mark Chaves & William Tsitsos, Are Congregations Constrained by Govern-
ment? Empirical Results from the National Congregations Study, 42 J. CHURCH & 
STATE 335 (2000). RLUIPA opponents who rely on this study include CHRISTOPHER 
L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 271 & n.67 (2007), and Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: 
The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 
IND. L.J. 311, 351–52 & nn.161–64 (2003).  
 111. Robert W. Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation?  Protecting Religious Land Uses 
After Boerne, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 861, 863 n.23 (2000). 
 112. See Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Judicial Review of Local Land Use Decisions: 
Lessons from RLUIPA, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 717, 754 & n.176 (2008) (citing 
Chaves & Tsitsos, supra note 110). 
 113. Chaves  & Tsitsos, supra note 110, at 341.  
 114. Id. at 340 tbl.1. 
 115. Religious Liberty: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 
149–51 (1999) (statement of Douglas Laycock). 
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in the Chaves data is inconsistent with the evidence of the hearing 
record and the twelve years of litigation since RLUIPA was enacted. 
This is equally true of a study by a Yale law student who found lit-
tle evidence of zoning discrimination against churches in New Ha-
ven.116  Good for New Haven.  But no one ever claimed that churches 
face hostile zoning in every jurisdiction in the country.  The claim has 
always been that churches face hostile zoning in enough jurisdictions 
to be a significant problem for religious liberty.  And the evidence of 
that continues to accumulate. 
II.  MODERATE ENFORCEMENT OF RLUIPA 
A second criticism of RLUIPA is that it makes churches largely 
“immune from local zoning laws.”117  According to this view, courts 
have aggressively interpreted RLUIPA, giving churches “an unfair 
advantage” in the land-use process.118  Because of this unfair ad-
vantage, “towns and cities [are] being terrorized by overzealous or-
ganizations representing religious landowners,”119 and the mere invo-
cation of RLUIPA is enough to frighten local officials into “‘rubber 
stamp’ approval of any development proposed by a religious organi-
zation.”120 
Twelve years of experience under RLUIPA have exposed this 
rhetoric as greatly exaggerated.  Churches are not immune from zon-
ing.  They must go through the zoning process, and they lose when 
they overreach.  Governments can avoid most problems under 
RLUIPA if they treat churches equally and ensure that there are ad-
equate opportunities for them to locate within the jurisdiction.  Gov-
 
 116. Stephen Clowney, Comment, An Empirical Look at Churches in the Zoning 
Process, 116 YALE L.J. 859, 863 (2007). 
 117. Daniel P. Lennington, Thou Shalt Not Zone: The Overbroad Applications 
and Troubling Implications of RLUIPA’s Land Use Provisions, 29 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 805, 806 (2006); see also Salkin & Lavine, supra note 16, at 256 (“RLUIPA has 
not leveled the playing field for certain groups who might face discrimination, but ra-
ther it is [sic] has given religious groups almost free reign [sic] to control community 
development in the name of religious exercise.”). 
 118. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 16, at 255; see also Hamilton, supra note 15 
(claim that RLUIPA “torque[s] all local land use decisionmaking in favor of all 
churches and synagogues and mosques”). 
 119. Hamilton, supra note 17. 
 120. Salkin & Lavine, supra note 16, at 252 (quoting Press Release, Office of Hon. 
Patrick Withers, Legislator Withers Demands Changes in Religious Land Use Law 
(Jan. 11, 2007); see also id. at 256 (stating that RLUIPA “has proven to be a night-
mare for local government officials and for communities”). 
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ernments can regulate the location of churches if they do not use that 
power to discriminate or exclude. 
A. No Avoiding the Land-Use Process 
Courts have repeatedly rejected the claim that it violates RLUIPA 
to require churches to apply for a permit or go through a costly land-
use process.  In San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill,121 a 
Christian college filed a re-zoning application seeking permission to 
use property as a college.  The city rejected the application as “in-
complete,” and the college sued under RLUIPA.122  The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that there was no substantial burden under RLUIPA, be-
cause it appeared that the college was “simply adverse to complying 
with the [zoning] ordinance’s requirements.”123  The court said that if 
the college would submit a complete application, “it is not at all ap-
parent that its re-zoning application will be denied.”124 
Similarly, in Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chica-
go,125 five Chicago-area churches sued under RLUIPA, challenging 
the city’s zoning ordinance based on the difficulties they faced in ob-
taining special use permits.  But all five churches had eventually 
found a place to meet.126  The Seventh Circuit rejected their claims, 
emphasizing that “the costs, procedural requirements, and inherent 
political aspects” of the special-use process are “incidental to any 
high-density urban land use” and thus “do not amount to a substantial 
burden on religious exercise.”127 
In other words, RLUIPA does not grant a “free pass for religious 
land uses.”128  Churches are subject to the ordinary delay, inconven-
ience, and expense of complying with local land-use procedures. 
B. No Free Pass for Commercial Activities 
A variation on the “free pass” argument is the contention that be-
cause RLUIPA defines “religious exercise” to include “any exercise 
of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of re-
 
 121. 360 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 122. Id. at 1028–29. 
 123. Id. at 1035. 
 124. Id. 
 125. 342 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 126. Id. at 756–58. 
 127. Id. at 761. 
 128. Id. at 762. 
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ligious belief,”129 it allows religious groups to claim “that virtually any 
activity is religious, merely because it is done by them.”130  Thus, 
“[c]atering halls are religious; day-care centers are religious, and so 
on,” and it is “difficult, if not impossible, for local communities to 
challenge such claims, even when they seem more opportunistic than 
authentic.”131 
This criticism is not true either.  RLUIPA’s definition of religious 
exercise, which is in fact tautological, states that all religious exercise 
is included, and rejects cases that divided religious exercise into pro-
tected and unprotected categories based on the court’s assessment of 
the intensity of religious motivation or the centrality of the practice to 
a larger body of belief.132  The court still must determine that the pro-
posed use of property is an exercise of religion. 
Religious groups frequently lose under RLUIPA when they seek 
special treatment for uses that resemble a commercial activity more 
than a church.  In Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Chey-
enne,133 for example, a church sought a variance so that it could oper-
ate a 100-child daycare center in a residential zone.  The church 
planned to charge a market rate for its services and to hire caregivers 
who were not members of the church.134  Internal correspondence 
 
 129. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2006). 
 130. Hamilton, supra note 17. 
 131. Id.; see also Diane K. Hook, Comment, The Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act of 2000: Congress’ New Twist on “Speak Softly and Carry a 
Big Stick,” 34 URB. LAW. 829, 854 (2002) (predicting that RLUIPA would unduly 
protect accessory uses such as “parochial schools, day care centers, playgrounds, 
baseball or softball fields, homeless shelters, administrative buildings, cemeteries, and 
coffee houses”); Sara C. Galvan, Note, Beyond Worship: The Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 and Religious Institutions’ Auxiliary Uses, 
24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 207, 220 (2006) (suggesting that RLUIPA has “expand[ed] 
the class of protected religious uses to all auxiliary uses”). 
 132. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 30 (1999) (stating that this definition “clarif[ies] 
issues that had generated litigation under RFRA”); see also Hatch-Kennedy State-
ment, supra note 2, at S7776 (“[N]ot every activity carried out by a religious entity or 
individual constitutes ‘religious exercise.’  In many cases, real property is used by re-
ligious institutions for purposes that are comparable to those carried out by other in-
stitutions.  While recognizing that these activities or facilities may be owned, spon-
sored or operated by a religious institution, or may permit a religious institution to 
obtain additional funds to further its religious activities, this alone does not automati-
cally bring these activities or facilities within the bill’s definition or [sic] ‘religious ex-
ercise.’  For example, a burden on a commercial building, which is connected to reli-
gious exercise primarily by the fact that the proceeds from the building’s operation 
would be used to support religious exercise, is not a substantial burden on ‘religious 
exercise.’”). 
 133. 451 F.3d 643 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 134. Id. at 648. 
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from the church also suggested that the daycare center “seems to look 
more like a commercial venture and less like a religious function.”135  
The jury agreed: it rejected the church’s RLUIPA claim on the 
ground that it “had failed to prove the proposed operation of the day-
care center was a sincere exercise of religion.”136 
Similarly, in Greater Bible Way Temple of Jackson v. City of Jack-
son,137 a church sought rezoning so that it could build an assisted liv-
ing center for the elderly and disabled.  The city refused, and the 
church sued under RLUIPA.  The Michigan Supreme Court rejected 
the claim on the ground that building an apartment complex was not 
a religious exercise: 
No evidence has been presented to establish that the proposed 
apartment complex would be used for religious worship or for any 
other religious activity.  Instead, it appears that the only connection 
between the proposed apartment complex and “religious exercise” is 
the fact that the apartment complex would be owned by a religious 
institution.  Generally, the building of an apartment complex would 
be considered a commercial exercise, not a religious exercise.  The 
fact that the apartment complex would be owned by a religious insti-
tution does not transform the building of an apartment complex into 
a “religious exercise,” unless the term is to be deprived of all practi-
cal meaning.138 
This analysis is questionable on the facts of the case, because the 
“apartment complex” would actually have been “an assisted living 
center for elderly and disabled people,” and an integral part of the 
church’s religious mission.139  But judicial resistance to such character-
izations is common, and the principle is sound: RLUIPA does not 
protect commercial investments owned by churches.  Other courts 
have reached similar results.140 
 
 135. Id. at 664. 
 136. Id. at 648. 
 137. 733 N.W.2d 734 (Mich. 2007). 
 138. Id. at 746. 
 139. Greater Bible Way Temple of Jackson v. City of Jackson, 708 N.W.2d 756, 
759–61 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005), rev’d, 733 N.W.2d 734 (Mich. 2007).  
 140. See Bram Alden, Comment, Reconsidering RLUIPA: Do Religious Land Use 
Protections Really Benefit Religious Land Users?, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1779, 1793–95 
(2010) (discussing cases finding no “religious exercise”); see also Cathedral Church of 
The Intercessor v. Inc. Vill. of Malverne, 353 F. Supp. 2d 375, 390–91 (E.D.N.Y. 
2005) (finding no substantial burden in part because “while some of the expansion 
plans dealt with development of the sanctuary area, the majority of it was in building 
out administrative offices.  Simply because the Church is a religious institution does 
not mean it receives an unencumbered right to zoning approval for non-religious us-
es.”); cf. Ridley Park United Methodist Church v. Zoning Hearing Bd. Ridley Park 
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In Calvary Christian Center v. City of Fredericksburg,141 a church 
sought to lease its building to a for-profit, secular school serving disa-
bled children.  The court rejected the church’s RLUIPA claim, find-
ing that no religious exercise was involved; rather, the tenant was “a 
for-profit school that would just happen to be housed in a church.”142 
In Scottish Rite Cathedral Association v. City of Los Angeles,143 a 
Masonic temple sought permission to rent out its facilities for cultural 
and commercial events that would fund its religious activities.  Treat-
ing Masonic rituals as religious, the court held that “a burden on a 
commercial enterprise used to fund a religious organization does not 
constitute a substantial burden on ‘religious exercise’ within the 
meaning of RLUIPA.”144 
In Glenside Center, Inc. v. Abington Township Zoning Hearing 
Board,145 the court rejected a RLUIPA claim by an organization host-
ing Alcoholics Anonymous meetings, concluding that “the group 
meetings are for the purpose of treating addictions and not for exer-
cising religion.”146 
None of this is to say that religious groups always lose when they 
invoke RLUIPA in support of religious activities beyond the church 
itself.147  Nor are all of the decisions above necessarily correct.  Some 
seem clearly correct; others might reasonably have been decided the 
other way if the court had more sympathetically considered the 
claimant’s religious motivation.  But right or wrong, these decisions 
confirm that RLUIPA has not given religious groups carte blanche to 
 
Borough, 920 A.2d 953, 957–61 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007) (rejecting a claim by a church 
daycare under the state Religious Freedom Protection Act, which has a narrower def-
inition of “substantial burden,” because “daycare is not a fundamental religious activ-
ity of a church”). 
 141. 800 F. Supp. 2d 760 (E.D. Va. 2011). 
 142. Id. at 772. 
 143. 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 207 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
 144. Id. at 216. 
 145. 973 A.2d 10 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009).  
 146. Id. at 18. 
 147. See Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 347–48 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (protecting a freestanding Jewish school under RLUIPA); Men of Destiny 
Ministries, Inc. v. Osceola Cnty., No. 6:06-cv-624-Orl-31DAB, 2006 WL 3219321, at 
*4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 6, 2006) (finding that a faith-based drug-and-alcohol treatment 
center was the exercise of religion, but denying claim on merits).  There are also cases 
where the court assumed (without deciding) that a religiously affiliated organization 
was engaged in an exercise of religion but rejected the RLUIPA claim on other 
grounds. See, e.g., Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., Inc. v. Morgan Cnty., 397 F. 
Supp. 2d 1032, 1050 (S.D. Ind. 2005) (nonprofit hospital); Ventura Cnty. Christian 
High Sch. v. City of San Buenaventura, 233 F. Supp. 2d 1241, 1243, 1246–51 (C.D. 
Cal. 2002) (religious high school). 
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treat “virtually any activity [a]s religious.”148  Rather, courts have 
carefully considered whether a particular activity is religious exercise, 
and have rejected claims where they are not persuaded that it is. 
C. No Substantial Burden When There Are Ready Alternatives 
Even when an activity is undisputedly religious, courts have reject-
ed RLUIPA claims on the ground that the church has failed to 
demonstrate a “substantial burden.”  Typically, this occurs when the 
particular location at issue has no religious significance and there are 
“quick, reliable, and financially feasible alternatives”149 that meet the 
church’s needs, or “plenty of land” available to churches.150  In World 
Outreach Conference Center v. City of Chicago,151 for example, a 
church sought to demolish an apartment house that was adjacent to 
its building and to construct a “Family Life Center” in its place.  The 
city refused, deeming the apartment house to be a landmark.152  The 
Seventh Circuit rejected the church’s RLUIPA claim, because the 
church had a “suitable alternative site for building a family-life cen-
ter”—a vacant portion of property it already owned—and the city 
committed itself to let the church build on it, so there was no substan-
tial burden.153  Other cases have employed similar reasoning, some-
times on more marginal facts.154 
Such reasoning is appropriate when there really are “quick, relia-
ble, and financially feasible alternatives,” or there really is “plenty of 
 
 148. Hamilton, supra note 17. 
 149. Westchester, 504 F.3d at 352. 
 150. Petra Presbyterian Church v. Vill. of Northbrook, 489 F.3d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 
2007) (“When there is plenty of land on which religious organizations can build 
churches (or, as is common nowadays, convert to churches buildings previously in-
tended for some other use) in a community, the fact that they are not permitted to 
build everywhere does not create a substantial burden.”). 
 151. 591 F.3d 531 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 152. Id. at 538–39. 
 153. Id. at 539.  
 154. See, e.g., Int’l Church of Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 634 F.3d 
1037, 1045 (9th Cir. 2011) (reversing a summary judgment on the ground of no sub-
stantial burden, where church’s realtor had offered evidence that “no other suitable 
sites exist in the City to house the Church’s expanded operations”), cert. denied, 132 
S. Ct. 251 (2011); Calvary Christian Ctr. v. City of Fredericksburg  800 F. Supp. 2d 
760, 774 (E.D. Va. 2011) (refusing preliminary injunction where the church “has not 
pled facts to show a lack of alternatives to the proposed site for the day school”); 
Wesleyan Methodist Church of Canisteo v. Vill. of Canisteo, 792 F. Supp. 2d 667, 674 
(W.D.N.Y. 2011) (dismissing claim where the church acknowledged “that it had sev-
eral other alternatives available to it, including building new structures on its existing 
property”). 
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land” available.  But such reasoning could lead to a de facto repealer 
of RLUIPA’s substantial-burden section if applied indiscriminately to 
any possibility of an alternative location.  It cannot be enough that af-
ter suit is filed, the city identifies one or a few parcels somewhere.  
Nor can churches be required to retain an expert witness to prove a 
negative, analyzing every parcel in the jurisdiction to show that no al-
ternatives were available.  Few, if any, churches could afford that.  It 
should be enough for the church’s real estate agent to describe the 
search that resulted in the site selected. 
If a city wants to defend on the ground that other sites are availa-
ble, those sites must be available in fact and not just in theory, and 
their availability must be apparent with reasonable search efforts.  
There must be sites available for churches of the full range of sizes 
and financial means.  Megachurches may present difficult issues, but 
they are a constitutionally protected form of religious exercise and 
have to go somewhere.  At the other extreme, half of all churches 
have fifty or fewer actively participating adults.155  They need sites 
that are small and inexpensive, often rented in houses or storefronts. 
If a city is to rely on the availability of other sites, churches must 
have a way of learning what sites are available.  A city should not be 
permitted to argue that sites are available if those sites are subject to 
a conditional-use permit or similar requirement and the city refuses to 
provide reliable guidance about whether it will grant the permit.  The 
permit process forces churches into a guessing game, in which they 
have to acquire a site, or acquire a lengthy option on a site, and then 
seek permission to use it in a political process that, for the reasons al-
ready discussed,156 is often hostile to their interests.  The process can 
turn into a game of gotcha, in which the available site is always some 
other site, but never the site the church has actually purchased—
which seems to be what was happening to the Sikhs in Guru Nanak.157  
If a city is unable or unwilling to make a range of sites available as of 
right, then it must be more accommodating when a church seeks to 
use the site it could find, or it must provide reliable guidance to 
churches about what it will and will not approve. 
Neither RLUIPA nor the typical state law of land-use regulation 
requires cities to help churches find sites.  But both cities and church-
es would be better off if cities did so.  If a city wants to direct the loca-
 
 155. MARK CHAVES, CONGREGATIONS IN AMERICA 18 (2004). 
 156. See supra notes 19–109 and accompanying text. 
 157. Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 
2006); see supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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tion of churches and also avoid RLUIPA litigation, then it will build 
RLUIPA into its land-use process and it will provide advice and 
guidance to churches seeking to locate in places acceptable to the city. 
We mention these points to avoid being misunderstood.  Churches 
lose when the city disapproves one site but other sites were freely 
available, and this pattern helps to demonstrate that RLUIPA is not a 
repealer of land-use regulation as it applies to churches.  And we 
agree that some of these losses were deserved.  But courts must be 
cautious with this doctrine, and realistic about the many problems 
churches face in the land-use process, lest reliance on the theoretical 
or after-the-fact availability of other sites turn into a repealer of 
RLUIPA’s substantial-burden provision. 
III.  UNDER-ENFORCEMENT OF RLUIPA 
RLUIPA has, if anything, been under enforced.  This under-
enforcement has surfaced with respect to both the substantial-burden 
provision and the equal-terms provision, and it has resulted in lengthy 
litigation, and sometimes losses, in cases that churches should have 
easily won. 
A. Judicial Reluctance 
Some judges have appeared reluctant to fully enforce RLUIPA.  
There are several possible reasons for this reluctance.  One is faith in 
the local land-use process.  Some judges may believe that the local 
land-use process works fine; that churches do not often face either 
hostility or discrimination; or that federal judges should be deferential 
on such a traditionally local matter.158  Such a judge’s inclination 
would be to construe RLUIPA narrowly. 
A stronger version of this view would be that federal interference 
with local land-use regulation is illegitimate and to be minimized.  
This sentiment seems to be prevalent in state courts, where RLUIPA 
cases have sometimes received a hostile reception. 
An example is Greater Bible Way Temple of Jackson v. City of 
Jackson,159 in which a church sought rezoning to build an assisted liv-
 
 158. See, e.g., River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 
367, 388–89 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Sykes, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority 
for its “emphasis on the police-power legitimacy of exclusionary zoning” and a result-
ing “deference toward land-use regulation that is fundamentally inconsistent with 
RLUIPA and the First Amendment’s guarantee of the right of free religious exer-
cise”). 
 159. 733 N.W.2d 734 (Mich. 2007). 
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ing center for the elderly and disabled.  As discussed above, the court 
rejected the claim on the questionable but at least plausible ground 
that housing the elderly and disabled was not a religious exercise.160  
But it did not stop there.  The court also held that even if housing the 
needy were a religious exercise, the church had not suffered a sub-
stantial burden;161 that even if the church had suffered a substantial 
burden, the denial of rezoning was the least restrictive means of fur-
thering a compelling interest in maintaining the character of the 
neighborhood;162 and that even if the city had not shown a compelling 
governmental interest, RLUIPA did not apply to a denial of rezoning 
in the first place.163  The court went out of its way to opine on four in-
dependent bases for rejecting the RLUIPA claim, even though any 
one of the four would have sufficed.  In the course of doing so, it 
adopted extremely narrow definitions of “substantial burden” and 
“individualized assessment,” and an extremely broad definition of 
“compelling governmental interest.”  As three justices pointed out, all 
but one of these determinations were unnecessary dicta.164  But the 
effect has been to gut RLUIPA in Michigan state courts.  In the near-
ly six years since Greater Bible Way, no reported RLUIPA claim in a 
Michigan state court has survived summary judgment.165 
Another example is Cambodian Buddhist Society of Connecticut, 
Inc. v. Planning and Zoning Commission of Newton, in which the 
Connecticut Supreme Court held that the denial of a “special excep-
tion” to build a Buddhist temple was not subject to RLUIPA.166  Re-
markably, the court held that the denial of a “special exception” did 
not involve an “individualized assessment” under RLUIPA—even 
though the denial of the special exception required the zoning com-
mission to conduct an individualized review of the temple’s potential 
 
 160. Id. at 745–46; see supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 161. 733 N.W.2d at 746–50. 
 162. Id. at 751–54. 
 163. Id. at 742–44. 
 164. Id. at 755 (Cavanagh, J., concurring); id. (Kelly, J., concurring). 
 165. See Great Lakes Soc’y v. Georgetown Charter Twp., Nos. 296370, 296372, 
2011 WL 1600496, at *6–11 (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2011) (granting summary judg-
ment to township on equal-terms and nondiscrimination claims); Great Lakes Soc’y 
v. Georgetown Charter Twp., 761 N.W.2d 371, 387–89 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (grant-
ing summary judgment to township on substantial-burden claim); Shepherd Montes-
sori Ctr. Milan v. Ann Arbor Charter Twp., 761 N.W.2d 230 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) 
(reversing summary judgment for the plaintiff on the RLUIPA claim on the basis of 
Greater Bible Way, but directing summary judgment for the plaintiff on its equal-
protection claim), rev’d on the equal-protection claim, 783 N.W.2d 695 (Mich. 2010). 
 166. 941 A.2d 868 (Conn. 2008). 
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impact on the surrounding area.167  This decision is clearly wrong, 
goes against every other court to address the question168 and clear 
congressional intent,169 and dramatically reduces the applicability of 
RLUIPA’s substantial-burden provision in Connecticut state courts. 
Even if the court’s interpretation of “individualized assessment” 
were right, the judgment would still be wrong.  The substantial-
burden provision also applies when a substantial burden “would af-
fect . . . commerce . . . among the several States.”170  The construction 
of a 6000-square-foot meeting hall, which would hold five major Bud-
dhist festivals annually,171 would plainly have affected commerce.  
The construction workers on the project would undoubtedly have 
been subject to federal labor and employment regulation based on 
the Commerce Clause,172 the completed building would have been 
heated, cooled, and insured in interstate commerce, and the festivals, 
even if nonprofit, would have been an activity in commerce.173  But 
churches and their lawyers have not litigated the Commerce Clause 
 
 167. Id. at 892–93. 
 168. See, e.g., Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 
978, 986–87 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the denial of a conditional-use permit was 
an individualized assessment); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 
1214, 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding a town’s zoning ordinance, which required 
churches and synagogues to obtain conditional-use permits to locate in most areas, to 
be “quintessentially an ‘individual assessment’ regime”); Church of Scientology of 
Ga., Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, No. 1:10-CV-00082-AT, 2012 WL 500263, at *15 
n.20 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 10, 2012) (collecting cases).  One court has held that a denial of 
rezoning is not an individualized assessment, see Greater Bible Way, 733 N.W.2d at 
743–44, but that court expressly distinguished denial of a variance, id. at 744 n.14, and 
in any event, that conclusion is also wrong. See, e.g., Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek 
Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2005) (treating 
the denial of rezoning as subject to RLUIPA); San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of 
Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2004) (same).  The allegedly contrary cases on 
which the Connecticut court relied mostly predated RLUIPA, and none were an in-
terpretation of RLUIPA’s individualized-assessment provision. 
 169. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 17 (1999) (“Local land use regulation, which 
lacks objective, generally applicable standards, and instead relies on discretionary, 
individualized determinations, presents a problem that Congress has closely scruti-
nized and found to warrant remedial measures under its Section 5 enforcement au-
thority.”); id. at 25 (“Land use regulation is commonly administered through individ-
ualized processes not controlled by neutral and generally applicable rules.”). 
 170. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(2)(B) (2006). 
 171. See Cambodian Buddhist, 941 A.2d at 874–75. 
 172. See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 
100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975) (applying labor laws and antitrust laws to dispute between 
construction company and construction union). 
 173. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatanna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 
572–75 (1997) (holding that non-profit activities affect commerce and that a tax on 
real estate can discriminate against interstate commerce). 
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question in subsequent cases.  There has been no reported RLUIPA 
decision in any Connecticut state court in the four years since Cam-
bodian Buddhist.  Lawyers appear to have read this opinion as a sig-
nal of general hostility to the statute. 
Setting aside federalism concerns, some judges are simply hostile to 
religious exemptions.  This hostility can stem from a belief that reli-
gious exemptions are bad policy, that they are best left to the legisla-
ture, or that they violate the Establishment Clause.  Only RLUIPA’s 
substantial-burden provision actually creates a form of religious ex-
emption, but judicial hostility to exemptions can spill over to the 
strong antidiscrimination protections in the equal-terms and nondis-
crimination provisions, and to the exclusion-and-limitation provision, 
which is based on more general First Amendment protections that 
cover speech as well as religion.174 
The notion that RLUIPA violates the Establishment Clause should 
have been put to rest by the Supreme Court’s decision in Corporation 
of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Amos.175  There, the Court unanimously upheld Title VII’s 
religious exemption, explaining that “it is a permissible legislative 
purpose to alleviate significant governmental interference with the 
ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious 
missions.”176  Nevertheless, in 2003, the Sixth Circuit struck down 
RLUIPA’s prisoner provisions as a violation of the Establishment 
Clause.  The Supreme Court unanimously reversed in Cutter v. Wil-
kinson,177 explaining that RLUIPA’s prisoner provision is “compati-
ble with the Establishment Clause because it alleviates exceptional 
government-created burdens on private religious exercise,”178 and 
noting that under the Sixth Circuit’s view, “all manner of religious ac-
commodations would fall.”179  In addition to Amos and Cutter, the 
Court has unanimously stated the same rule three other times in well-
considered dicta as it addressed related issues about religious exemp-
tions.180  This repeated unanimity makes clear that occasional deci-
 
 174. See Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 67–77 (1981) (restricting 
use of zoning power to exclude “a broad category of protected expression” from a 
jurisdiction).  
 175. 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
 176. Id. at 335. 
 177. 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
 178. Id. at 720. 
 179. Id. at 724.  
 180. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705 
(1994) (stating that “the Constitution allows the State to accommodate religious 
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sions invalidating particular exemptions as potentially discriminato-
ry181 or too absolute182 deal with special cases and do not undermine 
the general rule upholding exemptions to relieve burdens on the free 
exercise of religion. 
These cases are equally applicable to RLUIPA’s land-use provi-
sions.  But despite five unanimous repetitions of the point, some 
courts continue to suggest that RLUIPA must be construed narrowly 
to avoid violating the Establishment Clause.  As one court put it: 
“‘RLUIPA occupies a treacherous narrow zone between the Free 
Exercise Clause . . . and the Establishment Clause’ and compels states 
to ‘pursue a course of neutrality towards religion, favoring neither 
one religion over others nor religious adherents collectively over 
nonadherents.’”183 
 
needs by alleviating special burdens” and reaffirming Amos); id. at 711–12 (Stevens, 
J., concurring) (distinguishing the facts of Grumet from “a decision to grant an ex-
emption from a burdensome general rule”); id. at 716 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(“The Constitution permits ‘nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption[s]’” 
(quoting Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (emphasis by Justice 
O’Connor))); id. at 723–24 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (approving Amos and similar 
cases); id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court has also long acknowledged the 
permissibility of legislative accommodation.”); Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 
(1990) (“a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted”); id. at 893–
97 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that regulatory exemptions for religious prac-
tice are not just permitted, but constitutionally required); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bull-
ock, 489 U.S. 1, 18 n.8 (1989) (plurality opinion) (approving Amos); id. at 28 
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (approving Amos); id. at 38–40 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing that regulatory and tax exemptions are generally permitted and sometimes re-
quired).  Justice White’s brief concurrence in Texas Monthly, id. at 25–26, said noth-
ing about the exemption issue, but his views were clear because he had written the 
Court’s opinion in Amos. See also Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Re-
ligious Behavior and the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793 (2006) (demonstrating that there is no support in the 
original understanding for the view that regulatory exemptions for religious practice 
raise an Establishment Clause issue, and arguing that exemptions are fundamentally 
different from financial support). 
 181. See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 705 (objecting that “[h]ere the benefit flows only to a 
single sect”). 
 182. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) (objecting to 
“unyielding weighting in favor of Sabbath observers”). 
 183. Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 379 F. Supp. 2d 550, 558 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mamaroneck, 368 F.3d 
183, 189 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting (in the second internal quotation) Grumet, 512 U.S. 
at 696 (plurality opinion))); see also Scottish Rite Cathedral Ass’n of L.A. v. City of 
Los Angeles, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 207, 215 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting an over-
lapping passage from Westchester, 386 F.3d at 189); Cambodian Buddhist Soc’y of 
Conn., Inc. v. Newtown Planning & Zoning Comm’n, No. CV030350572S, 2005 WL 
3370834, at *9 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 18, 2005) (same). Cf. Living Water Church of 
God v. Charter Twp. of Meridian, 258 F. App’x 729, 741 n.6 (6th Cir. 2007) (inter-
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Other courts have expressed hostility to religious exemptions as a 
matter of institutional competence.  According to these courts, judges 
should not be in the business of drawing a line between religious ac-
commodations and government interests; that task should be left to 
the political branches. 
A prominent example is Potter v. District of Columbia,184 which in-
volved the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, a statute with a sub-
stantial-burden provision that applies to all federal regulation.  The 
question was whether requiring firefighters to shave their religiously 
mandated beards was the least restrictive means of furthering a com-
pelling governmental interest.  Judge Robertson was not happy with 
the question: “The dispute in these RFRA cases,” he said, “is precise-
ly the sort of police power matter that is best entrusted to the politi-
cally accountable branches.”185  In his view, “Courts have little com-
petence” to decide the scope of religious exemptions, and “[w]ithout 
RFRA, it would not be the business of the judicial branch” to do 
so.186  “Yet, whether or not it was wise to assign such questions to the 
courts, Congress has done so, and I am charged with answering them 
here.”187 
Judge Robertson ultimately ruled in favor of the religious claim-
ant.188  But his sentiment—that judges should not second-guess the 
legislature’s denial of a religious exemption—is common.  It animat-
ed the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith.189 
In part for the reasons reviewed in Part I, we think this suspicion of 
religious exemptions is especially mistaken as applied to RLUIPA.  
Congress created a judicial check and balance to local land-use regu-
lation of churches because that regulatory process is individualized 
and highly discretionary, subject to political pressures from constitu-
ents with no obligation to take any account of religious liberty, not in-
frequently hostile to religious uses in general or to minority religious 
 
preting ‘substantial burden’ narrowly, lest RLUIPA become “vulnerable to attack 
under the Court’s ‘Establishment Clause’ jurisprudence”). 
 184. Nos. 01-1189 (JR), 05-1792 (JR), 2007 WL 2892685 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2007). 
 185. Id. at *1. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at *9. 
 189. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (concluding that political discrimination against reli-
gious minorities is preferable to a system “in which judges weigh the social im-
portance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs”); see Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 439 (2006) (noting that 
government had argued for narrow interpretation of RFRA by citing “the very sort 
of difficulties” the Court had relied on in Smith). 
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uses in particular, and apart from RLUIPA, often subject only to 
highly deferential judicial review.  But whatever its merits, the view 
that judges should not decide religious exemption cases is abroad in 
the land, and it likely plays a role in some of the under-enforcement 
of RLUIPA. 
B. Substantial Burden 
One area of under-enforcement is RLUIPA’s substantial-burden 
provision, which requires the government to satisfy strict scrutiny 
whenever a land-use regulation imposes a substantial burden on reli-
gious exercise.190  RLUIPA does not define “substantial burden.”  In 
accordance with the legislative history, several courts have held that it 
should be interpreted “by reference to Supreme Court jurispru-
dence.”191  This congressional deference to precedent was a compro-
mise.  We never found out whether Congress could have agreed on a 
definition of burden, because People For the American Way (PFAW) 
steadfastly insisted that it would oppose any bill that attempted a def-
inition.192  And because the religious groups could not pass a bill 
without the support of the secular civil liberties groups, PFAW had an 
effective veto. 
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on substantial burden does not 
provide detailed guidance in RLUIPA cases.  The Court treated bur-
den as obvious when religiously motivated conduct was prohibited,193 
or penalized with loss of government benefits.194  And it found no 
burden when believers complained about the government’s manage-
ment of its own property or operations in cases where religiously mo-
tivated conduct had not been regulated at all.195  The cases on loss of 
government benefits make clear that government can substantially 
burden religious exercise without making it impossible.  But those 
 
 190. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a) (2006). 
 191. Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1315 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hatch-
Kennedy Statement, supra note 2, at S7776); Westchester Day Sch. v. Vill. of Mama-
roneck, 504 F.3d 338, 348 (2d Cir. 2007) (same); Vision Church v. Vill. of Long 
Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 997 (7th Cir. 2006) (same). 
 192. This history does not appear to have made it into the written record, but Pro-
fessor Laycock vividly recalls the frustrated discussion of this point within the Coali-
tion for the Free Exercise of Religion. 
 193. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972). 
 194. See, e.g., Frazee v. Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Un-
employment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 
707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 195. See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988); Bow-
en v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
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cases do not strike all judges as clearly analogous to the typical land-
use case, in which government regulation makes religious exercise 
much more difficult.  If courts focus only on the legislative deference 
to Supreme Court precedent, and do not take account of RLUIPA’s 
underlying purpose, they have ample flexibility to interpret “substan-
tial burden” in ways that implement, undermine, or effectively repeal 
RLUIPA’s substantial-burden provision. 
Several courts have recognized that “a burden need not be found 
insuperable to be held substantial.”196  Thus, for example, courts have 
found a substantial burden where a church is confined to religiously 
inadequate facilities;197 where a church has “no quick, reliable, or 
economically feasible alternatives”;198 where a city has rejected a 
church’s request on arbitrary or inconsistent grounds,199 has rejected 
reasonable compromise measures,200 or has subjected the church to 
unfair dealing;201 or where a church suffers “delay, uncertainty, and 
expense” during the zoning process—especially when there is a 
 
 196. See, e.g., Int’l Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of San Leandro, 634 
F.3d 1037, 1046 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 251 (2011); Westchester Day Sch., 
504 F.3d at 349; Sts. Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of 
New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895, 901 (7th Cir. 2005); Reaching Hearts Int’l, Inc. v. Prince 
George’s Cnty., 584 F. Supp. 2d 766, 785 n.14 (D. Md. 2008). 
 197. Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 352 (finding a substantial burden where a 
zoning board’s decision confined a religious school to an inadequate facility); Sts. 
Constantine & Helen, 396 F.3d at 898, 901 (holding that denial of a zoning variance 
was a substantial burden on a church that was outgrowing its existing facilities in a 
nearby town when that denial resulted in significant delay, uncertainty, and expense). 
 198. Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 352–53; see also Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of 
Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 992 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding a substantial 
burden where the county had “to a significantly great extent lessened the prospect of 
Guru Nanak being able to construct a temple in the future”); Islamic Ctr. of Missis-
sippi, Inc. v. City of Starkville, 840 F.2d 293, 299 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding a substantial 
burden under the Free Exercise Clause where the city made a mosque “relatively in-
accessible within the city limits to Muslims who lack automobile transportation”); 
Barr v. City of Sinton, 295 S.W.3d 287, 305 (Tex. 2009) (finding a substantial burden 
under Texas RFRA where “alternatives for the religious exercise are severely re-
stricted”). 
 199. See Westchester Day Sch., 504 F.3d at 350–52 (emphasizing the arbitrary na-
ture of zoning denial in finding a substantial burden); Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 990–
91 (noting “inconsistent decision-making” in finding a substantial burden, because it 
implied that no permit application would ever be granted). 
 200. See Sts. Constantine & Helen, 396 F.3d at 898, 901 (considering the rejection 
of a mitigation measure that would “limit the parcel to church-related uses” in find-
ing a substantial burden); Guru Nanak, 456 F.3d at 991 (considering the county’s 
“disregard[], without explanation, . . . of various mitigation conditions” in finding a 
substantial burden). 
 201. See World Outreach Conference Ctr. v. City of Chicago, 591 F.3d 531, 537–38 
(7th Cir. 2009). 
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“whiff of bad faith” from the city202 or when the church is impecuni-
ous.203 
In contrast with these decisions, some courts have adopted a much 
higher bar for what constitutes a substantial burden.  In one early 
case, the Seventh Circuit held that a land-use regulation imposes a 
substantial burden only when it “bears direct, primary, and funda-
mental responsibility for rendering religious exercise—including the 
use of real property for the purpose thereof within the regulated ju-
risdiction generally—effectively impracticable.”204  In fact, this is of-
ten the effect of exclusionary zoning of churches.  But this standard is 
also too restrictive, extremely difficult to prove, and inconsistent with 
the statutory text.  As the Eleventh Circuit pointed out,205 the Sev-
enth Circuit’s standard equates the substantial-burden provision with 
RLUIPA’s separate provision that prohibits a jurisdiction from “to-
tally exclud[ing]” or “unreasonably limit[ing]” religious assemblies.206  
And depending on how a court interprets “effectively impracticable,” 
this standard would potentially allow cities to defend by always point-
ing to Eldorado—someplace else, perhaps real and identified, but 
more likely vague and theoretical, where the church might someday, 
somehow, be allowed to locate.  Fortunately, at least two circuits have 
explicitly repudiated this standard,207 and the Seventh Circuit seemed 
to quietly abandon it,208 at least for a time. 
But the standard, and the sentiment embodied in it, still hangs 
around.  The Seventh Circuit invoked it once again in Vision Church 
v. Village of Long Grove.209  The city involuntarily annexed the 
church’s property to gain jurisdiction over it, enacted a new ordinance 
specifically designed to limit the church’s size, limited the church’s 
size to less than sixty percent of what it proposed, and restricted the 
 
 202. Sts. Constantine & Helen, 396 F.3d at 901. 
 203. World Outreach, 591 F.3d at 537 (“[B]urden is relative to the weakness of the 
burdened.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 204. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th 
Cir. 2003).  
 205. Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 & n.10 (11th 
Cir. 2004). 
 206. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(3) (2006). 
 207. See Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 988 
n.12 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting “effectively impracticable” standard); Midrash Sephar-
di, 366 F.3d at 1227 (same). 
 208. See, e.g., World Outreach, 591 F.3d 531, 537–38 (finding a substantial burden 
without mentioning the “effectively impracticable” standard); Sts. Constantine & 
Helen, 396 F.3d at 899–901 (same). 
 209. 468 F.3d 975, 997 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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number and size of religious services the church could hold.210  The 
Seventh Circuit acknowledged that some of these restrictions were 
“troublesome,” but it accepted the city’s rationalizations, and it found 
no substantial burden because, in its view, the larger facility was 
needed only for future growth and was not needed imminently.211  
The court also rejected an equal-terms claim, explaining away the 
city’s approval of a much larger school on adjoining property on the 
ground that the school had been approved before the new ordinance 
had been enacted.212 
Another troubling example is Living Water Church of God v. 
Charter Township,213 where a growing church applied for a permit to 
expand its building from 10,925 square feet to 34,989 square feet.  The 
Planning Commission recommended approval, but the Township 
Board refused to approve anything larger than 25,000 square feet.214  
The district court found, in considerable detail, that a 25,000-square-
foot building would be inadequate for the church’s needs.215  The 
Sixth Circuit quoted these findings,216 and it did not hold that they 
were clearly erroneous.217  Instead, it largely ignored them.  It said 
that the question is whether the church suffers a substantial burden 
“now—not five, ten or twenty years from now.”218  But the district 
court’s finding had been about now, and not about the distant future.  
Then the Sixth Circuit listed a number of things the church could do 
in a 25,000-square-foot building, and it ignored or dismissed as irrele-
vant the many things the district court had found that it could not do 
in a 25,000-square-foot building.219  The opinion is inexplicable apart 
from the court’s view that substantial burden must be narrowly inter-
preted to avoid imagined difficulties under the Establishment Clause, 
a view wholly at odds with Supreme Court precedent.220 
 
 210. See id. at 981–84, 997–99. 
 211. Id. at 999–1000. 
 212. Id. at 987 & n.11, 1003. 
 213. 258 F. App’x 729 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 214. Id. at 731–32. 
 215. Living Water Church of God v. Charter Twp., 384 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1133–34 
(W.D. Mich. 2005), rev’d, 258 F. App’x 729 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 216. Living Water Church of God, 258 F. App’x at 737–38. 
 217. Id. at 739. 
 218. Id. at 738. 
 219. Id. at 738–39. 
 220. See supra notes 175–82 and accompanying text. 
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C. Equal Terms 
Another area of visible under-enforcement is RLUIPA’s equal-
terms provision.  This provision makes it unlawful to “impose or im-
plement a land-use regulation in a manner that treats a religious as-
sembly or institution on less than equal terms with a nonreligious as-
sembly or institution.”221  It is apparent on the face of the statute that 
the substantial-burden provision contains a defense of compelling 
government interest, and that the equal-terms provision does not.  
The substantial-burden provision is in subsection (a)(1), and the 
compelling-interest defense is embedded in a sentence that states the 
rule on substantial burdens.222  The equal-terms, nondiscrimination, 
and exclusion-and-limitation provisions are in the three subsections of 
section (b), and no defense is stated for any of them.223 
This distinction did not happen by accident.  The predecessor bill, 
the proposed Religious Liberty Protection Act, from the very begin-
ning pointedly provided a standard of justification for substantial 
burdens, but none for excluding religious assemblies in places where 
secular assemblies were permitted.224  This language was further re-
fined in the 1999 version of the bill, but the distinction with respect to 
standards of justification remained.225  It was retained in the final lan-
 
 221. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2006). 
 222. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).  The jurisdictional prerequisites are stated in subsec-
tion (a)(2), so that they too apply only to the substantial-burden provision. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000cc(a)(2). 
 223. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b). 
 224. The Religious Liberty Protection Act, as of June 1998, is reprinted in Reli-
gious Liberty Protection Act of 1998, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Consti-
tution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 4019, 105th Cong. 1–4 (1998) [here-
inafter 1998 House Hearing]. Proposed § 3(b) provided:   
(1) LIMITATION ON LAND USE REGULATION.—No government shall impose 
a land use regulation that— 
  (A) substantially burdens religious exercise, unless the burden is the least 
restrictive means to prevent substantial and tangible harm to neighboring 
properties or to the public health or safety; 
  (B) denies religious assemblies a reasonable location in the jurisdiction; 
or 
  (C) excludes religious assemblies from areas in which nonreligious as-
semblies are permitted. 
Id. at 2. 
 225. The bill is reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 106-219, at 2–4 (1999).  Proposed § 3(b) 
provided: 
(1) Limitation on land use regulation.—  
  (A) Where, in applying or implementing any land use regulation or ex-
emption, or system of land use regulations or exemptions, a government has 
the authority to make individualized assessments of the proposed uses to 
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guage of RLUIPA.226  Despite the clarity of the statutory text, several 
courts have generally imposed limiting constructions on the equal-
terms provision, refusing to interpret it according to its terms. 
There are two types of equal-terms challenges: facial and as-
applied.227  A facial challenge is available when a zoning ordinance 
differentiates between religious assemblies and nonreligious assem-
blies on its face—for example, by permitting private clubs to locate in 
a district by right, but excluding churches.228  An as-applied challenge 
is available when a zoning ordinance treats religious assemblies 
equally on its face but unequally in practice—for example, where an 
ordinance permits both private clubs and churches to apply for per-
mits, yet private clubs receive them more readily.229 
 
which real property would be put, the government may not impose a sub-
stantial burden on a person’s religious exercise, unless the government 
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person is in furtherance 
of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of 
furthering that compelling governmental interest. 
  (B) No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a 
manner that does not treat religious assemblies or institutions on equal 
terms with nonreligious assemblies or institutions. 
  (C) No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation that 
discriminates against any assembly or institution on the basis of religion or 
religious denomination. 
  (D) No government with zoning authority shall unreasonably exclude 
from the jurisdiction over which it has authority, or unreasonably limit with-
in that jurisdiction, assemblies or institutions principally devoted to religious 
exercise. 
Id. at 2. 
 226. Of course this distinction did not persist by accident through multiple drafts 
and three years of deliberation.  Supporters of the bill repeatedly discussed whether 
there should be a compelling-interest exception to the equal-terms provision.  The 
view that prevailed was that there are no acceptable justifications for such discrimina-
tion.  But so far as we are aware, none of these discussions were on the record.  
 227. See Konikov v. Orange Cnty., 410 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2005); cf. Primera 
Iglesia Bautista Hispana of Boca Raton, Inc. v. Broward Cnty., 450 F.3d 1295, 1308 
(11th Cir. 2006) (identifying a third possibility: a challenge to “a facially neutral stat-
ute that is nevertheless ‘gerrymandered’ to place a burden solely on religious, as op-
posed to nonreligious, assemblies or institutions”).  
 228. See Digrugilliers v. Consol. City of Indianapolis, 506 F.3d 612, 614–15, 618 
(7th Cir. 2007) (finding a possible equal-terms violation because the city allowed 
“auditoriums, assembly halls, [and] community centers” as a matter of right, but re-
quired churches to obtain a variance); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 
366 F.3d 1214, 1220, 1231 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding equal-terms violation where ordi-
nance allowed not-for-profit associations for “social, educational, or recreational 
purposes,” but not for religious purposes) (emphasis omitted). 
 229. See Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Boulder 
Cnty., 613 F.3d 1229, 1236–38 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding an equal-terms violation 
where a county granted a permit to a school but not to a similarly situated church); 
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The circuits are currently split on the legal standard governing a fa-
cial equal-terms challenge.  Relying on RLIUPA’s plain language, the 
Eleventh Circuit holds that “[t]here are four elements of an Equal 
Terms violation: (1) the plaintiff must be a religious assembly or insti-
tution, (2) subject to a land use regulation, that (3) treats the religious 
assembly on less than equal terms, with (4) a nonreligious assembly or 
institution.”230  The dissenters in the Third and Seventh Circuits ad-
vocated for a similar plain-language approach.231 
Under this approach, to make a prima facie case, the plaintiff need 
only identify a religious assembly, identify a secular assembly, and 
then show that a land-use regulation treats the religious assembly less 
favorably on its face.232  So, for example, if a zoning ordinance ex-
cludes churches where it permits private clubs, it violates the equal-
terms provision.233  The Eleventh Circuit then allows the government 
an opportunity to satisfy strict scrutiny234—a departure from the text, 
but as we shall see, a far smaller departure than that in some other 
circuits.  At least the burden of justification is on the government, and 
the standard of justification is high. 
The Third and Seventh Circuits, by contrast, have added a fifth el-
ement to the test for a prima facie equal-terms violation.  In these cir-
cuits, it is not enough to show that a zoning ordinance treats religious 
assemblies worse than secular assemblies; the plaintiff must also show 
that the religious assembly and secular assemblies “are similarly situ-
ated as to the regulatory purpose” of the ordinance.235  So, for exam-
ple, a city can exclude churches and permit private clubs, as long as 
 
Konikov, 410 F.3d at 1327–29 (finding an equal-terms violation where a county inter-
preted its facially neutral ordinance in a way that disfavored religious assemblies). 
 230. Primera Iglesia, 450 F.3d at 1307. 
 231. See River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 389 
(7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Sykes, J., dissenting) (“The Eleventh Circuit correctly 
reads the provision textually, without glossing it with an artificial ‘similarly situated 
comparator’ requirement . . . .”); Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism v. City of Long 
Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 283 (3d Cir. 2007) (Jordan, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“The correct analysis should begin and, to the extent possible, end with the 
language of the statute.”). 
 232. See Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1230–31.  
 233. See id. at 1231.  
 234. See id. at 1235. 
 235. Lighthouse Inst., 510 F.3d at 266 (emphasis omitted).  The Seventh Circuit us-
es a slightly different formulation, asking whether the religious and nonreligious as-
semblies are similarly situated as to “accepted zoning criteria.” River of Life, 611 
F.3d at 371 (emphasis omitted).  According to the Ninth Circuit, this variation makes 
little difference. Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma, 651 F.3d 
1163, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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the exclusion of churches serves a legitimate regulatory purpose—
such as creating an “entertainment area . . . full of restaurants, bars, 
and clubs.”236  This reading allows for an individualized, discretionary 
administration of land-use regulation, and consequently, a high po-
tential for discrimination—the exact outcomes Congress was trying to 
eliminate.  The Ninth Circuit also adopted the “similarly situated as 
to regulatory purpose” test,237 but it requires the government to show 
that the two places of assembly are not similarly situated.238  The 
court said that making the “similarly situated” requirement part of a 
prima facie case would be inconsistent with both the statutory text239 
and a provision that expressly puts the burden of persuasion on the 
government once the claimant shows a prima facie case.240 
Regardless of who has the burden of persuasion, this test of “simi-
larly situated as to regulatory purpose” is impossible to square with 
the text or policy of RLUIPA.  Congress easily could have added a 
“similarly situated” requirement to the equal-terms provision by stat-
ing, “No government shall impose or implement a land-use regulation 
in a manner that treats a religious assembly or institution on less than 
equal terms with a [similarly situated] nonreligious assembly or insti-
tution.”241  Congress has used the term “similarly situated” some nine-
ty-six times.242  Or it could have prohibited discrimination “because 
of,” or “on the basis of,” the religious nature of the assembly—as it 
did in the adjacent subsection of RLUIPA, prohibiting any “land use 
regulation that discriminates against any assembly or institution on 
 
 236. Lighthouse Inst., 510 F.3d at 270–71. 
 237. Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1172. 
 238. Id. at 1171–73 & n.47. 
 239. Id. at 1171–72. 
 240. See id. at 1171; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b) (2006).  The court also reject-
ed a defense of compelling government interest as inconsistent with the statutory 
text. Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1171–72. 
 241. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (language in brackets added). 
 242. This count is based on a search in the text field of Westlaw’s USC database on 
March 7, 2012. Many of these uses of “similarly situated” bar discrimination, for ex-
ample, in statutes regarding labor and employment (“similarly situated” employees, 
29 U.S.C. § 2931(a)(1)(A) (2006)), employment benefits (“similarly situated” em-
ployees, 29 U.S.C. § 623(i)(10)(A)(i) (2006)), criminal procedure (“similarly situated” 
defendants, 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(2) (2006)), and the Armed Forces (“similarly situated 
members of . . . the uniformed services,” 37 U.S.C. § 403(g)(4) (2006)).  Elsewhere in 
the Code, the phrase is found in sections as diverse as the Internal Revenue Code 
(“similarly situated beneficiaries,” 26 U.S.C. § 4980B(f)(2)(A) (2006)), copyright laws 
(“similarly situated music users,” 17 U.S.C. § 513(7) (2006)), environmental laws 
(“similarly situated” lands, 16 U.S.C. § 1134(b) (2006)), and securities laws (“similarly 
situated” underwriters, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (2006)). 
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the basis of religion or religious denomination.”243  That language can 
be plausibly read to incorporate the standards developed under the 
228 or so statutory provisions that prohibit discrimination “because 
of” or “on the basis of” some protected category.244  The equal-terms 
provision means something different from, and something in addition 
to, the nondiscrimination provision. 
Following its successful experience with the Equal Access Act,245 
another religious liberty statute where Congress anticipated re-
sistance, Congress chose instead to enact the equal-terms provision as 
a flat objective rule.  Congress specified the way in which the two land 
uses must be similar: they must both fall within the categories of “as-
sembly” or “institution.”246  If so, they must be regulated on equal 
terms. 
According to the Seventh Circuit, “‘equality’ is a complex con-
cept,” and “[t]he fact that two land uses share a dictionary definition 
doesn’t make them ‘equal’ within the meaning of a statute.”247  But 
the statute does not require the land uses to be equal, or even require 
the “effects” of the land uses to be equal.  It requires the “terms” on 
which they are “treat[ed]” to be equal.248  The difference is significant.  
Suppose, for example, that Congress prohibited governments from 
 
 243. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(2) (2006). 
 244. This number is based on a search in the text field of Westlaw’s USC database 
for “discriminat! /s ‘on the basis of’” or “discriminat! /s ‘because of’” on June 2, 2012. 
This count includes a small number of false hits, where the search terms were not re-
lated to each other in the sentence. On the other hand, it is not adjusted for a much 
larger number of sections that use the search terms multiple times, creating multiple 
prohibitions. 
 245. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (2006) (requiring nondiscriminatory access to “limited open 
forum,” and providing that a “limited open forum” exists in any school that permits 
“one or more noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school premises dur-
ing noninstructional time”).  The Court rejected the argument that this language 
should be read to incorporate the pre-existing standard developed in the Court’s 
“limited public forum” cases.  “Congress’ deliberate choice to use a different term—
and to define that term—can only mean that it intended to establish a standard dif-
ferent from the one established by our free speech cases.” Bd. of Educ. of Westside 
Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 242 (1990).  The same reasoning applies to 
RLUIPA’s equal-terms provision.  Congress did not include a definition, but it used 
language obviously different from typical nondiscrimination statutes.  That difference 
in language states a different intended meaning. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1) (2006).   
 246. Konikov v. Orange Cnty., 410 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2005); Midrash Se-
phardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1230 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 247. River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 371 
(7th Cir. 2010) (en banc); see also Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City 
of Yuma, 651 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Under the equal terms provision, 
analysis should focus on what ‘equal’ means in the context.”). 
 248. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1). 
LAYCOCK & GOODRICH_CHRISTENSEN 7/11/2012  9:26 AM 
2012] RLUIPA 1063 
treating a religious assembly on less than equal terms with a single 
family home.  In this context, the plain meaning of “equal terms” 
would be that churches and single family homes must be subject to 
the same zoning requirements.  Requiring that churches also show 
they were “similarly situated” to single family homes would make no 
sense.  The statutory text has the same meaning when it is religious 
and secular assemblies that must be treated on equal terms.  In short, 
the focus should be on the equality of “terms”—the legal rules and 
government decisions to which places of assembly are subject.  These 
“terms” are much more readily ascertainable than the equality of 
“use” or “effects.” 
There is nothing strange about choosing the categories of assem-
blies and institutions as the relevant basis for evaluating equal treat-
ment.  Of course, religious assemblies and nonreligious assemblies 
will not always have identical land-use effects.  But no two land uses 
ever have completely identical effects.  Congress made the entirely 
rational judgment that a gathering for a religious purpose (like a 
church) will have similar land-use effects as a gathering for a nonreli-
gious purpose (like a club or movie theater). 
But what about big religious assemblies versus small secular as-
semblies?  According to the Third Circuit, the plain-language ap-
proach produces an absurd result: “[I]f a town allows a local, ten-
member book club to meet in the senior center, it must also permit a 
large church with a thousand members . . . to locate in the same 
neighborhood regardless of the impact such a religious entity might 
have . . . .”249 
This argument is a red herring.  Under the equal-terms provision, a 
city can place any restrictions on churches it wants as long as it places 
the same restriction on nonreligious assemblies.  It can limit churches 
and book clubs alike to 10 seats, or to 1000 seats, or to any other 
number.  Or, more commonly, it can limit the size of buildings, e.g., 
“no places of public assembly larger than 15,000 square feet.”  If a city 
is worried about traffic, it can impose traffic restrictions: e.g., limiting 
the size and capacity of assembly buildings permitted on certain types 
of roads.  If the city is worried about parking, it can impose parking 
restrictions: e.g., requiring all assemblies to provide four off-street 
parking spaces per 1000 square feet of assembly space. If it is worried 
 
 249. Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism v. City of Long Branch, 510 F.3d 253, 268 (3d 
Cir. 2007); accord Centro Familiar, 651 F.3d at 1172 (“Likewise, a ten-member book 
club is equal to a ten-member church for purposes of parking burdens on a street, but 
unequal to a 1000–member church.”). 
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about aesthetics, it can impose aesthetic restrictions: e.g., requiring all 
assemblies to have 100-foot setbacks and landscaping buffers. 
And if a city is worried about unforeseen circumstances, it can even 
impose a broad, catch-all requirement: e.g., that all assembly uses be 
“consistent with the characteristics of the neighborhood”—so long as 
that requirement is applied evenly to religious and non-religious as-
semblies.  Such a vague standard would be vulnerable to an as-
applied equal-terms challenge if it were enforced unevenly against 
churches, and any of these provisions might be challenged under the 
substantial-burden provision.  But like all the other examples listed 
here, such a standard on its face would be invulnerable to an equal-
terms challenge.  In an equal-terms challenge, it matters not how bur-
densome and unjustified the regulation, so long as religious assem-
blies are treated the same as nonreligious assemblies both facially and 
in practice. 
Cities impose these sorts of limits and requirements all the time.  
All the examples in the last two paragraphs (except for the book club 
and church from the Third Circuit’s opinion) are drawn from the 
“Public Assembly Ordinance” upheld in Vision Church v. Village of 
Long Grove.250 
The Third Circuit’s “similarly situated” test also raises more ques-
tions than it answers.  First, how does a court determine an ordi-
nance’s “regulatory purpose”?  There are several possible approach-
es.  The court could look for statements of purpose in the ordinance 
itself.251  But those are often absent.  It could defer to the purpose 
stated in the government’s litigation papers.  But that makes it easy to 
circumvent RLUIPA.  Or the court could look for an “objective” 
purpose by considering how the zoning code operates and the other 
types of uses it permits.252  But that inquiry is highly flexible and easy 
to manipulate.  RLUIPA’s text provides no guidance for these choic-
es: under the plain language, regulatory purpose is irrelevant to equal 
terms.  The only question is whether the same rules are applied to 
both religious and secular assemblies. 
 
 250. 468 F.3d 975, 993–94 (7th Cir. 2006). See LONG GROVE, ILL., VILLAGE CODE § 
5-9-12 (2009), available at http://www.sterlingcodifiers.com/codebook/index.php? 
book_id=363. 
 251. See Lighthouse Inst., 510 F.3d at 258. 
 252. See id. at 271–72. 
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The Seventh Circuit tried to solve this problem by substituting “ac-
cepted zoning criteria” for “regulatory purpose.”253  But as the court 
itself acknowledged, this approach is “less than airtight”;254 it merely 
trades one set of problems for another.  Courts in the Seventh Circuit 
now have to figure out what “zoning criteria” are “accepted.”  We 
know parking and traffic count; but what about furthering economic 
development, or generating municipal revenue?255 
Once a court determines the “regulatory purpose” or “accepted 
zoning criteria,” it must decide whether the two uses being considered 
are “similarly situated” with respect to that purpose or those criteria.  
This presents difficult questions.  For example, does a secular audito-
rium contribute more to a “sustainable retail ‘main’ street” than a 
church?256  Is a private club more consistent with economic develop-
ment than a church?  Such questions can easily turn an equal-terms 
case into a battle of expert witnesses, each opining on whether a given 
secular assembly contributes more to the regulatory purpose than a 
church, or conflicts with the regulatory purpose less.  Alternatively, 
these questions result in courts deciding zoning policy questions 
based on their intuition.  Nothing in the text or history of RLUIPA 
requires or permits this complicated, standardless inquiry to take the 
place of the easily administrable, bright-line rule that Congress enact-
ed. 
The “regulatory purpose” test also makes it easy to circumvent the 
statute.  A city can nearly always come up with some plausible-
sounding explanation for why it treats churches worse than other as-
semblies.  The most obvious reason is that churches are tax exempt.  
So if generating municipal revenue is an accepted criterion or pur-
pose,257 churches can be treated worse than every assembly that is not 
tax exempt.  That result, which would justify total exclusion of 
churches, cannot be squared with RLUIPA’s text, history, or pur-
pose.258 
 
 253. River of Life Kingdom Ministries v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 371 
(7th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 254. Id. at 374. 
 255. Id. at 373. 
 256. Lighthouse Inst., 510 F.3d at 270. 
 257. River of Life, 611 F.3d at 373. 
 258. See Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1231 n.14 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (“Zoning codes frequently exclude churches in places where they permit 
theaters, meeting halls, and other places where large groups of people assemble for 
secular purposes.” (quoting Hatch-Kennedy Statement, supra note 2)).  
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Even under the plain-language approach, a court has to decide 
which uses constitute an “assembly.”  That is easy for private clubs, 
meeting halls, community centers, auditoriums, and movie theaters, 
but some uses are harder to classify—such as restaurants, hotels, 
health clubs, or daycare centers.259  The Eleventh Circuit and the dis-
sent in the Seventh Circuit defined “assembly” as a “group of persons 
organized and united for some common purpose.”260  Thus, patrons at 
a restaurant may be a “group of persons” with a “common purpose” 
(eating and drinking), but they are not, in the ordinary sense, “orga-
nized and united” for that purpose—any more than a rush-hour 
crowd of pedestrians in New York City is “organized and united for 
some common purpose.”  Put another way, an “assembly” is different 
from a “crowd” or a “group.”  It is not just a collection of separate in-
dividuals who happen to be in the same place at the same time; it is a 
group organized and united for a common purpose.  This understand-
ing of “assembly” will provide adequate guidance in the vast majority 
of cases.  It also has the virtue of being rooted in the text of the stat-
ute. 
The bottom line is that several circuits have sharply narrowed the 
equal-terms provision.  Under a plain-language approach, the church-
es in Lighthouse and River of Life would have prevailed.261  But un-
der the “regulatory purpose” and “zoning criteria” tests, they lost.  It 
remains to be seen to what extent these tests will be used in the future 
to narrow the equal-terms provision.  In theory, the “accepted zoning 
criteria” test could be applied stringently, identifying only those zon-
ing criteria acceptable to the policies of RLUIPA, thus minimizing 
the damage to the statute.262  But at a minimum, these tests introduce 
a significant amount of uncertainty into what should be a clear, 
bright-line rule. 
 
 259. River of Life, 611 F.3d at 390 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 260. Id. at 389 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 132 (9th ed. 2009)); Midrash Sephardi, 366 F.3d at 1230 (emphasis add-
ed) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 111 (7th ed. 1999)). 
 261. See River of Life, 611 F.3d at 377, 389 (Sykes, J., dissenting); Lighthouse Inst., 
510 F.3d at 277, 283 (Jordan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 262. See Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma, 651 F.3d 1163, 
1173 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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D. Congregation Etz Chaim v. City of Los Angeles 
The difficulty of enforcing RLUIPA is illustrated by Congregation 
Etz Chaim v. City of Los Angeles,263 a case involving a small Hasidic 
shul in the Hancock Park neighborhood of Los Angeles.  The case 
has been dragging through state and federal courts for nearly fifteen 
years.264 
The case is thus older than RLUIPA, and it was one of the princi-
pal examples of the problem that Congress intended RLUIPA to fix.  
The congregation’s rabbi testified about the case with great effect at a 
House committee hearing on the bill.265  Other witnesses later re-
ferred to his testimony in their own testimony.266  The House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary included the case in the committee report on 
the Religious Liberty Protection Act.267  Senator Kennedy described 
the case on the floor when he introduced the bill that became 
RLUIPA.268  Rep. Hyde included the case in a list of examples sub-
mitted as an extension of his remarks, after enactment but prior to 
signing by the President.269  If RLUIPA cannot protect this shul, then 
it has failed to achieve an obvious part of the congressional purpose. 
And yet the case drags on, with the city and the neighbors making 
arguments that would effectively nullify RLUIPA if accepted.  The 
congregation first filed suit in July 1997.270  After four years of litiga-
tion, the case settled, with the city agreeing to permit the shul subject 
to several mitigating conditions.271  The city issued a building permit, 
 
 263. Congregation Etz Chaim v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 97-5042 CAS (Ex.), 
2009 WL 1293257 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2009). 
 264. See id. at *1–5 (reviewing the procedural history of the case to that point). 
 265. Protecting Religious Freedom After Boerne v. Flores, Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 32–36 
(1998) (statement of Rabbi Chaim Baruch Rubin, Congregation Etz Chaim, Los An-
geles, California). 
 266. See Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1999: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R. 1691, 106th Cong. 94 
(1999) (prepared statement of Rabbi David Saperstein); 1998 House Hearing, supra 
note 224, at 228 (prepared statement of Douglas Laycock). 
 267. H. REP. NO. 106-219, at 22 (1999). 
 268. 146 Cong. Rec. S6678-02, S6689 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) (statement of Sen. 
Kennedy). 
 269. 146 Cong. Rec. E1564-01, E1566 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000) (statement of Rep. 
Hyde). 
 270. Congregation Etz Chaim v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 97-5042 CAS (Ex), 
2009 WL 1293257, at *1 (C.D. Cal., May 5, 2009). 
 271. Id. at *1–2; Notice of Dismissal and Proposed Order at 7, Congregation Etz 
Chaim v. City of Los Angeles, No. 97-5042 HLH (Ex) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2002), ECF 
No. 166-1 [hereinafter Etz Chaim Settlement]. 
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then promptly attempted to revoke it, and unsuccessfully appealed a 
decision that the permit was valid and binding.272 
In July 2003, nearly two years after the settlement, a group of 
neighbors challenged the settlement agreement in federal court,273 
and another neighbor filed a state-court lawsuit.274  After four more 
years of litigation, the Ninth Circuit vacated the settlement agree-
ment, requiring the shul either to file a new permit application or to 
show that the city had violated RLUIPA.275  The court held that a set-
tlement could not bypass the procedural steps of the conditional-use 
permit process without proof of a violation of federal law.276  This 
holding is understandable, but it also presents a systemic problem for 
RLUIPA enforcement.  It means that cities cannot settle RLUIPA 
cases without the consent or at least the acquiescence of every single 
neighbor.  This vastly increases the number of parties with an effec-
tive veto over any settlement, and may result in much unnecessary lit-
igation.  It remains to be seen whether cities faced with neighbors 
demanding RLUIPA violations will be willing and able to stipulate to 
the evidence that proves the violation. 
The shul refiled its RLUIPA claims, but the court dismissed the 
case as not yet ripe: maybe the city would now grant a permit on a re-
newed application.277  So the shul again applied for a permit, seeking 
permission for the same use the city had agreed to allow in the set-
tlement.278  But the city again denied a permit, expressing fear that it 
would set a precedent for allowing churches.279  So the shul again filed 
its RLUIPA suit.  The city unsuccessfully argued that the decision of 
the zoning board was res judicata in the RLUIPA case,280 which of 
course would be the end of RLUIPA. 
 
 272. Congregation Etz Chaim v. City of Los Angeles, 371 F.3d 1122, 1123–27 (9th 
Cir. 2004). 
 273. Etz Chaim, 2009 WL 1293257, at *1–2. 
 274. Id. at *4. 
 275. See League of Residential Neighborhood Advocates v. City of Los Angeles, 
498 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 276. Id. at 1058. 
 277. Etz Chaim, 2009 WL 1293257, at *5–10. 
 278. See Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Denying Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 19, Congregation Etz Chaim 
v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 10-1587 CAS (Ex) (C.D. Cal. July 11, 2011), ECF No. 
157 [hereinafter Etz Chaim Summary Judgment]. 
 279. Id. at 12–13. 
 280. [Order Denying] Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Con-
gregation Etz Chaim v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 10-1587 CAS (Ex) (C.D. Cal. 
Jan. 6, 2011), ECF No. 62. 
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In July 2011, after fourteen years of litigation, the district court 
granted the shul partial summary judgment on both its substantial-
burden claim and its equal-terms claim, and preliminarily enjoined 
the city from enforcing its zoning ordinance to prevent use of the 
property consistent with the shul’s permit application.281  The settle-
ment agreement, and thus the permit application and the injunction, 
limited services to sixty people on the High Holy Days, to fifty on the 
Sabbath, and to much smaller numbers on weekdays.282  It also ex-
pressly prohibited “weddings, receptions or banquets of any kind, 
fund raising activities, day care, or funerals,” and “signs, posters or 
flyers.”283  So this shul is not, and under this injunction can never be, a 
full-service synagogue. 
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the city,284 the court 
found that the zoning code permitted religious uses in the neighbor-
hood with a conditional-use permit, but the city had made clear that it 
would never grant a permit to the shul.285  The court noted that the 
shul had encountered frequent hostility to its permit application,286 
and that despite the city’s argument that the findings of the zoning 
board should be res judicata, the zoning board had indicated that it 
could not and would not apply RLUIPA to the case.287 
The court found a substantial burden, rejecting the city’s argument 
that the shul could move to a nearby commercial zone or that its resi-
dents could attend nearby synagogues.288  The court found that many 
of the shul’s members were physically unable to walk to the more dis-
tant locations,289 and that the other synagogues practiced a different 
branch of Judaism and conducted services in a different language.290 
The city had denied the permit on the ground that it wanted to pre-
serve the residential character of the neighborhood, and that it want-
ed to avoid a precedent for religious uses.291  The first reason was in-
consistent with the many nonresidential uses the city had already 
 
 281. Etz Chaim Summary Judgment, supra note 278, at 19. 
 282. Etz Chaim Settlement, supra note 271, at 5–6. 
 283. Id. at 6. 
 284. Etz Chaim Summary Judgment, supra note 278, at 4. 
 285. Id. at 12. 
 286. Id. at 11. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 11–13. 
 289. Id. at 12. 
 290. Id. at 12–13. 
 291. Id. at 12. 
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allowed.292  The second reason would nullify RLUIPA;293 it amounted 
to saying that we exclude churches because they are churches and we 
wish to exclude them. 
The city’s other stated reason for refusing the permit was fear of 
traffic and parking problems.294  This is always pretextual in Orthodox 
Jewish cases; here as in other such cases, the worshipers all walk to 
services as a matter of religious obligation.295  But in this case, it gets 
worse.  The shul is on the corner of two major thoroughfares, High-
land Avenue and Third Street, that carry 80,000 cars a day.296  In the 
2001 settlement agreement, the city had required the shul to remove 
its parking spaces.297  Now it defended its denial of a permit on the 
ground that there were no parking spaces.298 
The court also found an equal-terms violation, on the basis of the 
many other nonresidential uses already in the neighborhood.299  The 
city defended principally on the ground that these uses predated the 
current zoning policy.300  The court rejected this argument for the 
sound reason that “one of the stated purposes of RLUIPA was to 
prevent discriminating against new religious entities in favor of al-
ready established religious and nonreligious entities.”301  The court al-
so noted that these institutions had been built at a time when Jews 
were not allowed to buy houses in Hancock Park,302 so they had 
missed their chance to be grandfathered in.  The court did not rely on 
 
 292. Id. at 12–13. 
 293. Id. at 13. 
 294. Id. at 12. 
 295. Id. at 11. 
 296. Plaintiffs Congregation Etz Chaim of Hancock Park and Congregation Etz 
Chaim’s [Proposed] Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law ¶ 
37, Congregation Etz Chaim v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 10-01587 (CAS) (Ex) 
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2011), ECF No. 84 [hereinafter Plaintiffs’ Undisputed Facts].  We 
do not rely on this document for any point that is in any way controverted in the 
city’s [Proposed] Statement of Uncontroverted Facts and Conclusions of Law, Con-
gregation Etz Chaim v. City of Los Angeles, No. CV 10-01587 CAS (Ex) (C.D. Cal. 
Mar. 28, 2011), ECF No. 82 [hereinafter Defendant’s Undisputed Facts].  The shul 
and the intersection are readily visible on the satellite view of Google Maps for 303 S. 
Highland Ave., Los Angeles, CA. 
 297. Etz Chaim Summary Judgment, supra note 278, at 12. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. at 13–17. 
 300. Id. at 15. 
 301. Id. at 15 n.5 (quoting Statement of Interest of the United States in Support of 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant’s 
Motion for Summary Judgment at 20, Congregation Etz Chaim v. City of Los Ange-
les, No. CV 10-01587 (CAS) (Ex) (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011)). 
 302. Id. 
LAYCOCK & GOODRICH_CHRISTENSEN 7/11/2012  9:26 AM 
2012] RLUIPA 1071 
the fact, but the shul noted that there were several Christian churches 
and parochial schools in the neighborhood.303  The city said that some 
of these were properly zoned,304 which does not answer the question 
of why they got zoning but the shul did not. 
It remains to be seen what will happen on appeal.  But this should 
have been an easy case.  The fact that the shul has had to litigate it for 
fifteen years and counting shows that enforcement of RLUIPA is not 
yet what it should be.  Congress was trying to protect churches from 
the forces that too often seek to exclude them from jurisdictions, but 
those forces still have many opportunities to throw sand in the gears 
of RLUIPA enforcement. 
CONCLUSION 
RLUIPA was and is needed.  Churches continue to be a disfavored 
use in the zoning context and fundamental First Amendment rights 
continue to be subject to highly discretionary decisions by local offi-
cials. 
With regard to adult entertainment establishments, the courts read-
ily brought the First Amendment to bear on the zoning process.305  
But with regard to churches, the techniques of exclusion were subtler, 
and courts were slower to recognize those techniques and respond.  
Thus, it was RLUIPA that brought the First Amendment to bear on 
the zoning process. 
Over the twelve years since its enactment, RLUIPA has proven its 
worth.  Churches have brought numerous successful lawsuits protect-
ing their core First Amendment rights, and many more cases have set-
tled.  Local officials are now on notice that they cannot treat churches 
as a disfavored land use, despite the issues with NIMBY neighbors, 
tax collection, or commercial districts, or fear of Muslims or other 
prejudices among their constituents. 
But that does not mean that RLUIPA gives churches a free pass on 
zoning.  Cities can still impose reasonable land-use conditions if they 
do not overreach and if they ensure that churches have ample oppor-
tunity to locate within the jurisdiction.  The key question going for-
ward is whether courts will fully enforce RLUIPA according to its 
terms—in particular, the key substantial-burden and equal-terms 
 
 303. Plaintiffs’ Undisputed Facts, supra note 296, ¶¶ 102, 118, 120, 122. 
 304. Defendant’s Undisputed Facts, supra note 296, ¶¶ 31, 33–34. 
 305. See Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain Actions Targeting First Amend-
ment Land Uses, 69 MO. L. REV. 653, 654–61 (2004). 
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provisions.  But if the first twelve years are any indication, RLUIPA 
will continue to be a pillar of civil rights protection for churches in the 
years to come. 
